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Dissertation Abstract 
Management scholars have rarely analyzed how prior social networks might help or 
hinder the job performance of new organizational members. However, internal and 
external job markets are increasingly characterized by high mobility of experienced 
professionals, who have extensive social networks rooted in their past collaborations and 
shared work experiences. Organizations rely more frequently on project teams and 
project-based organizing to perform interdependent tasks, so employees transition more 
often across project teams - and firms - in their boundary-less careers. These changes call 
for a better understanding of whether the reactivation of past social ties is likely to help or 
hinder the job performance of new employees, especially those engaged in highly 
interdependent tasks. The object of this study is to theorize and empirically test the 
mechanisms by which the reactivation of a particular social tie – shared work experience 
- may impact new members’ performance. Using a social networks lens to study new 
members’ organizational entries, this study not only contributes to the recent fast-
growing literature on the reactivation of social ties, but also to studies on new members’ 
performance, and has considerable relevance for enhancing an organization’s 
performance through the better management of its expert workers’ human and social 
capital. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Objective of the study: Analyzing Tie Reactivation 
A large body of work in management and sociology supports the view that social 
networks strongly matter in determining individual attainment. Networks have been 
shown to have a relevant impact on individual productivity (Castilla 2005), salary (Burt 
1997), intra-organizational careers (Podolny and Baron 1997), job seeking (Fernandez 
and Weinberg 1997), and the likelihood of “making the team” (Reagans, Zuckerman, and 
McEvily 2004). Whether analyzing relationships that are formal or informal (Fernandez 
1991), instrumental or affective (Casciaro and Lobo 2008), position or person-based 
(Podolny and Baron 1997), the extensive body of scholarly work on social networks “has 
focused primarily on current ties” (Levin, Walter, and Murnighan 2011:924).  
Thus, in recent years, scholars have started to analyze how networks change, looking 
at the emergence of new ties and the decay of old connections (Burt 2002). Network 
scholars have traditionally assumed that relationships may decay if not actively 
maintained (Coleman 1990; Burt 1992), and that the social capital - the set of “resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships […] 
of social units” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998:243) - and the benefits contained therein - 
may simply be lost (Burt 1992). Recently, an alternative view has emerged, which posits 
that social connections may experience life-cycles in which ‘active’ and ‘dormant’ phases 
alternate (Levin, Walter, and Murnighan 2011). This argument is based on the idea that 
individuals’ limited cognitive and physical resources constrain the number of relationships 
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that can be kept active at any point in time, but researchers have also shown that inactive 
relationships can still be reactivated and leveraged to provide benefits in the future 
(Pescosolido 1992; Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs 2000). The line of work on the 
reactivation of social ties conceptualizes networks as two-part structures, composed of an 
opportunity set of potential ties and a secondary subset of active ties (Smith, Menon, and 
Thompson 2012). 
This study extends the literature on tie reactivation by investigating whether a 
specific type of social tie – shared work experience, or the relational experience 
accumulated by two colleagues who have worked together before on interdependent tasks 
(Reagans, Argote, and Brooks 2005) – can be reactivated to provide performance 
advantages to new organizational members, and sheds additional light on important 
theoretical gaps that remain unexplored by the tie reactivation literature. Whereas prior 
researchers have shown that reactivated ties can be efficient conduits for information 
sharing (Srivastava 2011; Levin, Walter and Murninghan 2011), they have primarily been 
concerned with how cognitive processes affect tie reactivation – i.e. how individuals first 
recall the availability of personal contacts, and then exchange information with them 
through communicative acts (e.g. phone calls or e-mails). My study will instead focus on 
a behavioral reactivation process – or whether shared work experience can be reactivated 
when two colleagues re-engage in interdependent behaviors similar to those performed in 
the social context in which they originally accumulated such experience. When working 
interdependently, employees engage in relational forms of learning and accumulate shared 
work experience at the dyadic level, generating tacit rather than codified knowledge 
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(Reagans et al. 2005; Espinosa et al. 2007). This study explores whether such relationship-
specific capital – which tend to be ‘sticky’ and idiosyncratic to a specific social setting – 
can be reactivated and transferred to a different work place, improving the individual 
performance of the employees involved in the reactivated tie, or whether it simply gets lost 
when the two co-workers cease their original collaboration.  
What contributes to making tie reactivation more effective? The 
role of tie strength, sponsors’ networks and demographic 
similarity. 
In addition to analyzing the effect of shared experience reactivation on 
newcomers’ performance, I also explore which factors might favor or inhibit its 
effectiveness, helping to clarify the scope conditions that affect tie reactivation. As 
explained in Chapter 2, the reactivation of shared experience may be greatly helpful in 
enhancing the social integration of a new organizational member, and consequently her 
performance. The reactivated contact inside the organization may act as a sponsor for the 
new employee, providing help in terms of “learning the ropes” - grasping and fully 
understanding the new set of routines, social norms and behavioral expectations that 
characterize their new working context. However, several factors can play a crucial role 
in enhancing or inhibiting such process. In particular, I theorize and test whether 
relational embeddeness moderates the benefits of such reactivations, extending the 
current literature by studying the effects of the larger social structure in which the 
reactivated dyad is embedded. I also consider how time impacts the benefits of shared 
experience reactivation in two distinctive ways. First, I follow Levin and colleagues 
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(2011) by exploring whether the passage of time hinders the reactivation of past shared 
experience. In other words, whereas network scholars have studied the effect of decay on 
‘active’ ties, I explore whether the passage of time may make the effects of reactivated 
ties weaker. Second, I analyze whether reactivated shared experience may also enhance 
the speed of social integration of new members, allowing them to increase their 
performance earlier in their organizational life. 
The effect of such sponsorship may also be enhanced or reduced depending on 
whether the two parties involved in the reactivated tie share demographic similarity. The 
dyadic nature of shared experience (Reagans et al. 2005) is well suited to isolate the 
effect of race similarity between the two employees involved in the reactivated tie, or 
whether demographic similarity may inhibit such process. Since new members often have 
no established networks inside their new organization except for the reactivated tie, 
focusing on the demographic similarity of the individuals involved in the reactivated 
dyad will likely isolate the effect of demographic similarity from potential alternative 
network explanations, allowing for a fine-grained analysis of the effect of race similarity 
on network benefits. In doing so, I will not only offer an empirical test on whether 
demographic similarity helps or constraints the effect of networks on individual 
performance, offering for the first time a test of how demographic similarity interacts 
with the reactivation of social ties, but I will additionally test how relevant moderators – 
such as numerical proportion and sponsors’ relational embeddedness - can impact the 
effect of the reactivation of shared experience between members of different 
demographic groups. 
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Tie reactivation and newcomers’ performance: Managerial 
relevance. 
 Studying the effect of shared experience reactivations on newcomers’ 
performance also has important managerial repercussions. The addition of new members 
to a team or to an organization is arguably one of the most frequent and important events in 
the context of organizational life, and thus not surprisingly the socialization of new 
employees’ has been a central question in the management field (Van Maanen and Schein 
1979). The degree of socialization may dramatically vary across individuals, generating 
great variance in new members’ performance, and understanding what factors determines 
why “some newcomers…[are]…placed upon a path to termination whereas other 
newcomers…[are]…placed on a path to organizational socialization” (Cashman et al. 
1976:286) has deep and fundamental implications for organizations. Whereas multiple 
factors can determine the degree to which newcomers get socialized more quickly into a 
new social setting – for instance, psychological factors (Chen 2005), team level 
expectations (Chen 2005), and organizational tactics (Van Maanen and Schein 1979) – the 
literature has yet to examine whether social networks may inhibit or help newcomers’ 
successful integration into a new work setting, and hence their performance. With the 
notable exception of Castilla (2005), the current literature on newcomers’ performance has 
predominately assumed the newcomer as an atomistic, isolated element, who enters the 
new social setting in complete isolation. However, this assumption might not be true. In 
fact, new employees may have shared relationships in the past with one or more of his or 
her new colleagues – in particular, they might have been co-workers in a different 
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organization, or worked together on a common project in the past. Such relationships could 
be extremely important to facilitate newcomers’ integration – but both the literatures on 
newcomers’ performance and on social networks have yet to explore under which 
conditions the reactivation of these past work ties may help or hinder newcomers’ 
performance. 
The analysis of how the reactivation of shared work experience may impact new 
members’ performance is made more relevant by the fact that current labor markets – both 
internal and external to organizations – have been characterized by increasingly high 
degrees of employee mobility (O’Mahony and Bechky 2006). Since organizations rely 
more frequently on project teams (Hinds and Bailey 2003; O’Leary and Mortensen 2010) 
and project-based organizing (Maoret, Massa, and Jones 2011) to perform interdependent 
tasks, employees transition more often across teams and firms (Granovetter 1983) in their 
boundary-less careers (Arthur and Rousseau 2001). In contrast to the focus of early 
organizational scholars - who analyzed labor markets characterized by relatively low 
mobility and actors who are independent, atomistic agents and often entering their very first 
job (e.g. Louis, Posner, and Powell 1983) - current new employees are not necessarily 
inexperienced workers, but may be highly trained professionals with wide-ranging job 
experience and prior social networks, and often have extensive sets of past work 
relationships (Somaya, Williamson, and Lorinkova 2008). Thus a new employee may 
have worked in the past with one or more of their new colleagues on a common project, 
and probably for a different organization. The reactivation of such past shared experience 
could be extremely important in facilitating both the social integration and the job 
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performance of such a new member. Thus, given the frequency of employees’ transitions 
across organizational boundaries, it becomes imperative for organizations to facilitate an 
effective and quick integration of newcomers, which would lead to higher employee 
productivity, reducing at the same time turnover and the extremely relevant associated 
replacement costs (Bauer, Morrison and Callister 1997; Chen and Klimoski 2003). 
Empirical setting: The National Basketball Association. 
I plan on testing my hypotheses applying regression analysis on longitudinal data 
on basketball team membership and player individual performance. Using sport as a 
context for research provides scholars with several advantages, such as accurately 
measured data, transparency of strategy and processes, and a relatively controlled 
environment where all teams compete using the same rules and vying for the same goals 
(Wolfe et al. 2005). In particular, basketball teams are interdependent and tightly coupled 
systems. Many organizational teams closely resemble these systems, especially those in 
fast changing environments which require very frequent and close interaction among team 
members: good examples are consulting firms, creative advertising agencies, and cross-
functional teams in general.  
 My sample includes data from the National Basketball Association (NBA), 
including game-by-game data from 1985 to 2011. I will focus on the 5,866 instances in 
which a player joins a new team – since each of these players joined on average 2.91 teams 
in the course of his career, I will be able to analyze multiple organizational transitions for 
each individual. Moreover, given that an NBA season includes 82 games, the analysis of 
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game-level performance will allow me to study the evolution of individual performance 
within seasons, effectively accounting for the effect of socialization, yielding a sample of 
225,307 player-game observations.  
Potential contributions and structure of the study. 
 This study will provide important contribution both to theory and practice. 
Theoretically, I will contribute to both the literature on social ties reactivation and 
newcomers’ performance. So far, the literature on tie reactivation has described how 
social connections can switch between active or inactive (dormant) phases, and how 
reconnecting has profound informational advantages. Individuals can leverage dormant 
ties to acquire information that would not be available otherwise. However, these studies 
have yet to explore whether reactivation can have an effect also on the work place, in 
particular fostering new employees’ performance. Moreover, I will also extend such 
literature by specifying which characteristics of the original relationship may positively 
and negatively moderate the effect of its reactivation on newcomers’ performance. 
Furthermore, I will contribute to the literature on newcomers’ performance by providing 
one of the few longitudinal tests of new members’ productivity that uses an objective 
measure, showing how pre-existing social networks can have a deep impact on 
newcomers’ socialization. Moreover, my data panel will allow me to analyze employees’ 
transitioning across multiple organizations, overcoming a current limitation of the 
socialization literature, which tends to focus to studies of a single collective. 
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 I will structure the rest of this document as follows. In chapter 2, I will review the 
current literature on network reactivation, and then introduce the type of social tie that will 
be the focus of this study – shared work experience. I will therefore theorize the 
fundamental mechanisms that will explain why the reactivation of shared experience may 
have a positive impact on newcomers’ performance. I will then theorize the factors that 
may moderate the relationship between tie reactivation and performance. In particular, I 
will focus on three aspects: tie strength, the sponsors’ relational embeddedness and the 
process of tie decay. 
Chapter 3 will then be focused on investigating the role played by individuals’ 
characteristics on tie reactivation. In particular, I will consider race homophily a factor that 
may foster or undermine social ties reactivation. The characteristics of my data sample will 
allow me to study, for the first time, whether homophily in race may have an effect on 
shared experience reactivation, and ultimately on newcomers’ performance. 
My methodological approach and data description will be illustrated in chapter 4. I 
will empirically test the hypotheses developed in my previous three chapters using a 
longitudinal dataset on players’ membership and performance in National Basketball 
Association (NBA) from 1985 to 2011. I will provide extensive description of the variables 
used to capture my theoretical constructs, and explain the added benefits of using sports 
data to test the theory developed in this study. 
Finally, I will illustrate my findings in Chapter 5, and provide the discussion of my 
findings and the concluding remarks in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2: Exploring the performance effects of 
newcomers’ tie reactivation in interdependent 
organizations. 
Social ties reactivation: Information vs. relationship-specific 
capital. 
Social networks scholars interpret the nature of social ties in two distinctive ways - 
either as conduits of information or as sources of relationship-specific capital (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal 1998). The former view focuses fundamentally on which structural positions 
maximize the transmission of valuable (i.e. non-redundant) information (e.g. Burt 1992), 
the latter is concerned with the question of how relationship-specific capital – e.g. tacit 
knowledge, trust, interdependent routines and heuristics – generate higher performance 
(e.g. Krackhardt 1992; Reagans et al. 2005). 
The recent growing literature on social tie reactivation – which studies how such 
ties alternate between dormant and active phases – has primarily considered the 
interpretation of networks as information conduits, and so analyzed how such reactivated 
ties can enable communicative acts which can provide informational advantages, often 
under the pressure of environmental uncertainty. For instance, Srivastava (2011) has shown 
how top managers reactivate old connections, extending the range of their intra-
organizational network across departments, when their firm undergoes significant internal 
restructuring, to counter the uncertainty generated by such structural overhaul. Smith and 
colleagues (2012) have observed a similar mechanism in the process of job search: 
individuals seeking new jobs reactivate old contacts in search of information about 
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potential work opportunities. These dormant contacts have proven to be extremely valid 
and efficient sources of information due to their shared perspective, to the extent that 
reconnected ties may be as beneficial as current ones. In their study, Levin, Walter and 
Murnighan (2011) asked executives to revive connections that had been dormant for 
several years and to rate their benefits. Their findings show, although strong dormant ties 
showed some evidence of decay, that levels of shared perspective and trust between the 
executives were comparable to those in current strong ties and - most importantly - 
reconnected ties were efficient in conveying relevant information about work-related 
projects. Nevertheless, while reactivated dormant ties have proven to be efficient conduits 
of information, it remains to be seen whether the relationship-specific capital such ties 
contain can produce higher performance when they are reactivated. The object of this study 
is thus to clarify under which conditions a specific type of social tie – shared work 
experience – can be reactivated to benefit the performance of interdependent tasks.  
The reactivation of relationship-specific capital: Shared experience 
as a form of internal social capital. 
Recent studies have highlighted the existence and the relevance of social ties that 
embed a relationship-specific form of capital – shared work experience. When a group of 
employees work together on an interdependent task, they not only become more familiar 
with the task itself and with the team they work for, but also accumulate experience 
relationally (Reagans, Argote, and Brooks 2005; Espinosa et al. 2007). By working 
together, co-workers accumulate valuable experience that is relationship-specific, rather 
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than located in a the generic, distributed “collective mind”, as has been originally 
theorized by Weick and Roberts (1993).  
Such shared experience has proved extremely beneficial for team and 
organizational performance, as it leads to the development of shared norms, common 
language, and trust (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990), which increases the likelihood of 
standardization of practices and cooperative behaviors (Leana and Buren 1999; Jones, 
Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997), both of which will positively affect coordination and 
performance (Taylor and Greve 2006). These beneficial effects have been found in 
multiple contexts. For instance, Reagans and his colleagues (2005) found that shared 
experience reduced completion time in surgical teams via the improved division of labor 
and coordination which comes from knowing “who knows what” (Wegner 1987), and 
studying software development teams, Espinosa and his colleagues (2007) found that 
common experience among team members positively impacted performance because “the 
coordination complexity experienced by team members when working with other 
members is reduced when they are familiar with each other” (2007:615). 
Shared experience is a form of social capital under Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s 
(1998) general definition of social capital as being the set of “resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from the network of relationships […] of social units”. In 
particular, I argue that it is a form of internal social capital, i.e. accumulated within a 
specific social context. Social capital has been generally theorized in the literature as being 
either ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to a given collective, which may be a specific team, 
department, business unit or organization (Adler and Kwon 2002; Payne et al. 2011). 
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Whereas external social capital maps on to the actors’ structural position within a network 
as defined - for instance - by Burt (1992), internal social capital accumulates inside a 
specific collective, “as strong recursive bonds developed between actors who interact 
frequently” (Payne et al., 2011: 494).  
The ‘internal’ nature of shared work experience poses a fundamental puzzle related 
to the possibility of its reactivation. Since this form of social capital is embedded and built 
into the dyads forming the underlying social structure of a specific collective, it is a very 
valuable resource for the organization due to it tacitness and social complexity (Coff 1997). 
However, since internal social capital is a resource idiosyncratic to a specific set of 
individuals (Barney 1996; Coff 1997), a logical consequence is that the benefits of shared 
experience will simply disappear when their social ties are severed. Thus, it is not 
surprising that the current literature suggests that “the internal social capital shared with 
coworkers … may simply be lost” in such cases (Somaya et al. 2008, p.940), and that 
"long-term performance consequences … may be attributable to…the accumulated social 
capital lost through voluntary turnover” (Dess and Shaw, 2001: 449). 
Dyadic memory: How reactivated shared experience can enhance 
the performance of new organizational members. 
Whereas the loss of social capital by the focal organization may be inevitable when 
ties are broken, the relation-specificity of shared work experience suggest that its benefits 
may be renewable for the two individuals originally involved in such a connection. Figure 
1 illustrates the process through which the shared experience between two employees is 
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reactivated in a different context. Employees A and B (top left of the figure) are connected 
by a shared experience tie from when they originally (at t-2) worked together at 
organization Alpha. By extensively working together in the past, they accumulated 
relationship-specific capital: shared experience developed during the repetition of 
interdependent tasks which fosters the “development of relationships-specific heuristics 
that enhance how well people…interact with each other” (Reagans et al. 2005:872). These 
heuristics are part of an efficient and tacit understanding of how the two individuals work 
together, and are deeply engrained in the relationship-specific social capital, constituting a 
form of tacit knowledge. Such capital enhances how efficiently A and B perform their 
interdependent tasks, so giving A a direct performance advantage. 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Such advantages may disappear when employee B moves from organization Alpha 
to Beta at t-1 (as the Figure shows) and their collaboration is interrupted. B is now an 
isolate node in the Beta network, since she has (as yet) no shared experience with their new 
colleagues. Thus, we might expect that (ceteris paribus) B’s performance will suffer in the 
new social context as compared to in their previous organization Alpha, due to the lack of  
relationship-specific capital originally developed with her past colleague(s). Shared 
experience accumulates through task repetition, and it will take time for B to re-create a 
network of shared experience in her new work context. 
This challenge is less problematic for A, when she moves to organization Beta at 
time t. Thanks to their past shared experience with B during their tenure at Alpha, A is not 
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an isolated node in their new network, but instead can begin to reactivate and leverage part 
of the benefits specific to their past relationship with B. In other words, A and B can 
reactivate the relationship-specific capital – efficient routines, heuristics, and 
trustworthiness – engrained in their past collaboration. Such benefits do not simply 
disappear when the original tie de-activates, but rather become dormant: a form of 
“network memory” ready to be re-enacted (Soda, Usai, and Zaheer 2004). The reactivation 
process is akin to the process known as ‘muscle memory’ by physical trainers; an extensive 
task repetition that allows for the formation of routines that makes the performance of 
collaborative tasks almost automatic and easy to recall. Internal social capital built through 
extensive past interaction has been shown to have long-term repercussions, “cast[ing] a 
long shadow into the present” (Soda et al. 2004) – so we can expect A’s job performance as 
a new member of Beta to be higher when carrying out interdependent tasks in collaboration 
with B. 
The positive effects of reactivated shared experience ties on new 
member socialization. 
The positive effects of reactivated shared experience ties on new members’ performance 
are not strictly limited to the specific situations in which the new member works 
interdependently with a reactivated past contact, but can also facilitate faster socialization 
of the new member, thus increasing their individual performance in general. 
Research on new employees’ socialization has found that the degree of speed of 
socialization of new members may vary dramatically across individuals, generating great 
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variance in their performance. Established organizations have distinctive sets of embedded 
social norms, normative expectations or roles, and institutionalized routines used to 
perform their tasks, so, when new members join such social settings, they are likely to 
experience a profound disconnect between their expectations (built on their past experience 
elsewhere) and the social norms that operate in their new context. Such norms can often be 
so novel and different to what they are used to that researchers have described this situation 
as producing a ‘reality shock’, as “[new members’] entire organizationally-based physical 
and social world are changed” (Louis 1980). It is important to note that it is not only 
inexperienced workers who face these pressures, but also experienced employees who 
“join a new team, even within the same organization”, since every team and/or 
organization has idiosyncratic work procedures that determine, for instance, how they 
interact with clients and teammates, or how to use new technologies (Chen 2005:103). 
New organizational members need to make sense of their new social worlds 
quickly, leveraging the available information and social cues, in order to match the 
performance expectations placed on them. Whereas multiple factors can determine how 
quickly new members become socialized into a new social setting – for instance 
psychological factors (Chen 2005), team level expectations (Chen 2005), and 
organizational tactics (Van Maanen and Schein 1979) – the socialization and social 
networks literatures have yet to examine whether the reactivation of prior social ties may 
enhance the speed and the degree of new members’ integration into new work settings, 
which then influence their performance.  
Comparing the transitions of A and B to organization Beta (Figure 1) may help to 
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clarify how the presence of a reactivated social tie in the new organization can provide 
distinct advantages for newcomers’ socialization. After transitioning to their new 
organization, B’s lack of shared experience ties with Beta’s established workers (‘old-
timers’) means she can face a ‘liability of foreignness’, or the risk of being marginalized 
or stereotyped by old-timers (Perretti and Negro 2006). B’s position is particularly 
critical early in their socialization period, as old-timers’ initial expectations and 
evaluations are not only one of the “key force[s] during socialization” (Jackson, Stone, 
and Alvarez 1993:60), but are also “particularly important early in a newcomer’s 
socialization.” (Chen 2005:104). In comparison to B’s transition, A’s organizational entry 
is facilitated by their ability to reactivate their tie with B, which can help them become 
socialized more quickly by bridging the information and social gap between the 
newcomer and the incumbents. The past experience and trust embedded in the past tie 
may help the newcomer to break this social barrier and achieve effective communication 
with the old-timers, and thus aligning the shared expectations of the team to the 
newcomers’ actual behavior more quickly. The internal contact can vouch for the new 
person, providing detailed, fine-grained information about them, which is particularly 
critical, as initial expectations tend to be highly malleable (Chen 2005) and making it 
easier for the old-timers to accept the newcomer as part of their social group. Thus a 
reactivated tie makes it more likely for her to improve her performance more quickly 
during the initial socialization phase. 
The reactivated connection can also help the new member to navigate her new 
environment more easily. New employees often face a feeling of “information 
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deprivation” (Jablin 1987:622), and need to leverage as many information sources as they 
can to cope with their sense of strangeness in their new environment (Miller and Jablin 
1991). In such situations, a reactivated social tie can be of great help, as the relationship-
specific capital embedded in a shared experience tie may make the internal contact a 
reliable and easy to access source of detailed information, as a target of direct, overt 
questions about the new context, which have been argued as greatly helping newcomers’ 
integration (Miller and Jablin, 1991). A trusted contact is particularly important. New 
members tend to be extremely aware of the social costs associated with their requests, 
which may have negative consequences such as inhibiting newcomers from asking for 
information they are expected to know, annoying old-timers and generating social 
disapproval (Miller and Jablin, 1991). 
 The reactivated tie may not simply be a channel for general, publicly-available 
information about the new job, but also about context-specific norms and tacit knowledge 
that would be otherwise hard for the new member to grasp quickly, and which can often be 
a barrier to achieving successful integration. The reactivated internal contact may be able 
to provide a detailed view of the idiosyncrasies of the organizational and of new 
colleagues, giving the new member a “realistic job preview”, which “functions very much 
like a medical vaccination in its attempt to deflate newcomer expectations…by presenting 
job candidates with a small dose of ‘organizational reality’” (Popovich and Wanous 
1982:571). For instance, new members often lack the ability to decode the information 
they gain, due to a lack of a “context-specific dictionary” (Jablin 1987). Thus, by 
reactivating past shared experience, the internal contact can help the new member to 
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interpret what they experience such as distinguishing nuances within apparently clear 
rules, learning the intricacies of the informal networks acting as a role-model for the new 
member that provides “social enrichment” (Fernandez, Castilla, and Moore 2000; Castilla 
2005) through closer ‘on-the-job’ training and mentoring. 
The expected consequences of the performance benefits provided by a reactivated 
shared experience tie during the socialization period are graphically displayed in Figure 
2, which compares the performance patterns of a new organizational member with a 
reactivated tie (dashed line) to a new member who is an isolated node (in Figure 1, their 
network positions are exemplified by A and B, respectively). In both cases, we expect 
A’s performance to improve during her socialization period, as they learn more about 
their new social environment and tasks. The rate of this improvement will marginally 
decrease over time – past research has portrayed socialization as an adaptation process 
(Chan & Schmitt, 2000) characterized by negative acceleration where “performance 
change is likely to be more dynamic early in a period of socialization, when newcomers 
must learn how to match their behavior to the demands posed by their new work 
environment” (Chen 2005:103). A consequence of this initial dynamism is that we expect 
the effect of the reactivated tie to be stronger earlier during the socialization period - 
hence, the dashed line in Figure 2 (which represents the performance pattern for the new 
member with a reactivated tie) is characterized by a steeper marginal increase earlier on. 
If we couple this process with the fact that the earlier socialization phase has long term 
repercussions on new members’ performance, due to its “imprinting” nature (Jackson et al., 
1993), I expect the benefits derived from tie reactivation to yield performance advantages 
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to new members in such situations, and that such advantage will be stronger earlier in the 
socialization period, i.e. immediately after they join their new team or organization. Thus:  
H1a: A new organizational member reactivating a past shared experience tie with a 
current organizational member will achieve better individual performance than one 
without such reconnection.  
H1b: This reactivation effect will be stronger earlier in the socialization period. 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
The reactivation of relationally embedded ties: Tie strength as a 
positive moderator of shared experience reactivation on new 
member performance. 
Several factors can moderate the positive benefits of reactivated shared experience on 
new member performance. Granovetter’s distinction between strong and weak ties seems 
to be particularly important when evaluating the effect of tie reactivation on newcomers’ 
performance. Strong ties have been characterized by trust (Krackhardt 1992) and shared 
perspective (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), making it more likely for the connected 
parties to cooperate effectively with each other (Granovetter 1983; Reagans and McEvily 
2003) Individuals connected by strong ties “forge a common set of goals, values, 
language and understanding…preventing misinterpretation and misunderstanding” (Levin 
et al, 2011:925). We might expect new members may benefit even more from the 
reactivation of past strong ties, since the deeper levels of trust embedded in such ties may 
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make the social enrichment process more effective, and make such colleagues more 
willing to help one another (Reagans and McEvily, 2003). “Strong ties have greater 
motivation to be of assistance and are typically more easily available” (Granovetter 
1982:113) which tends to be even more important when individuals are facing uncertain 
situations such as organizational entry (Jones 1986). Indeed, strong ties foster “inclusion, 
cohesiveness and group identity…[and]…facilitate socialization by reducing 
individuality and individual power.” (Sparrowe and Liden 1997:530). Thus, new 
members reactivating strong ties with organizational incumbents are more likely to rely 
on such connection to gather relevant information, seek help, and achieve social 
integration sooner (Higgins and Kram 2001). The more two employees shared relevant 
work experience in the past, the stronger their bond will be because tie strength grows 
with close interactions over extended periods of time and increases the trust between the 
two parties (Krackhardt 1992). The high level of trustworthiness embedded in strong ties 
will make it more likely that the reactivated connection becomes an active sponsor of the 
new member, as well as more eager to help the new employee to learn the intricacies of 
the new environment, facilitating their faster and more complete “assimilation” 
(Sparrowe and Liden 1997, 2005). Thus, I expect that: 
H2: Tie strength will positively moderate the relationship between shared 
experience reactivation and new member performance. 
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Sponsor’s relational embeddedness as a moderator on the effect of 
tie reactivation on new members’ performance. 
The tie strength of the reactivated connection between the new member and the insider is 
not the only relational factor that can determine the quality of the new member’s 
integration: the relational embeddedness of the new member’s sponsor – i.e., of the 
internal contact with whom the reactivated tie is shared – can also moderate the 
effectiveness of tie reactivation on new members’ performance. Figure 3 illustrates the 
importance of the sponsor’s network position, comparing two settings where two new 
employees new to an organization (A and C) reconnect a past shared experience ties with 
B and D, respectively. The distinction between the two cases lies in the embeddedness of 
the reactivated sponsor –D’s network position in Delta is characterized by stronger ties 
than is C’s. 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
In order to understand why D’s greater embeddedness has a positive effect on the 
reactivated C-D tie - and thus on the performance of the new member - it is important to 
highlight that it may take time for old-timers to accept a new individual as a taken-for-
granted member of the organization. While the presence of a sponsor may certainly help, 
the new employee may still be considered a “stranger” (Simmel 1950) and remain 
suspect and disadvantaged in the eyes of the organizational incumbents (Sparrowe and 
Liden 2005), at least until they are able to prove themselves to be trustworthy to their 
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new colleagues. Social network scholars have found that, without such acceptance, new 
members are unable to reap the benefits of social networks (Burt 1992), which hurts their 
performance. In his analysis of managers’ individual attainment, Burt (1992, 1998) has 
shown that individuals who are not legitimate in the eyes of organizational incumbents 
are not able to gain positive benefits from their social networks. It is interesting to note 
that this finding does not relate to new members lack of experience - as Burt’s analysis 
focused on highly experienced top managers of a large, Fortune 100 company - but rather 
to them lacking trustworthiness in the eyes of incumbents. Gaining colleagues’ trust can 
be very time-consuming, potentially hurting new employees’ productivity during the 
initial socialization period. 
However new members can offset their initial lack of trustworthiness by 
‘borrowing’ social capital from an internal contact. As Sparrowe and Liden explain, 
“borrowing the social capital of well-connected sponsors overcomes shortfalls in 
legitimacy by endorsing an individual’s participation in the inner circles of players” 
(2005:512). Thus a new member who reactivates a connection with an incumbent can 
potentially leverage the sponsor’s position in the network to facilitate their social 
integration (Burt 1992). Since “[old-timers] develop trustworthiness through sharing trust 
relationships with others” (Sparrowe and Liden 2005:512), the internal contact can 
effectively channel trust towards the new employee by endorsing them, as long as they 
share strong, trusted ties with that colleague. Network scholars call this mechanism “trust 
transferability” (McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer 2003; Ferrin, Dirks, and Shah 2006), 
noting that it works because “trust in the [incumbent’s] judgment serves as the foundation 
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for trust in an unknown counterpart”. Hence, old-timers who acts as a sponsor for a new 
member transfer trust from themselves to the latter. For this mechanism to work, though, 
the sponsor must be ‘well-connected’ with the other old-timers via strong ties, which are 
characterized by trust (Krackhardt 1992). So we can expect that the stronger the ties 
between the sponsor and other incumbents, the more the new member will be able to 
‘borrow’ the sponsor’s social capital; this facilitates the transfer of trust from the sponsor 
to themselves (Sparrowe and Liden 1997, 2005), easies their acceptance into their new 
setting and consequently improves their performance. Therefore: 
H3: The sponsor’s relational embeddedness will positively moderate the effect of 
the reactivation of a shared experience tie on a new member’s performance. 
The effect of tie decay on shared experience reactivation. 
Time may also have a significant effect on shared experience reactivation, but empirical 
investigations of the contingency effects of time on network effects have generally been 
extremely limited (Burt 2000; Soda et al. 2004). Network scholars assume that active ties, 
if not maintained, erode over time (Coleman, 1990; Burt, 1992). For example, Burt (2002) 
has observed that ties that bridge separate parts of social networks tend to decay very 
quickly. Mariotti and Delbridge (2011) suggest that dormant ties may simply decay, when 
not reactivated after a long period. In the same way, we might expect that the effects 
triggered by tie reactivation would become weaker over time, more difficult, or even 
impossible. Thus:  
H4a: The length of the dormancy period negatively moderates the effect of shared 
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experience reactivation on the newcomer’s performance.  
Although we might expect that the longer the dormancy period, the less effective 
the reactivation process will be, certain characteristics of the dormant tie may affect the rate 
of its decay. This implies that not all ties decay at the same rate, but that certain 
connections can stay dormant for longer periods. Levin and colleagues (2011) suggested 
that tie strength may have a positive effect on the rate of dormant tie decay. Likening 
strong ties to lasting first impressions, they suggest that the higher level of trust originally 
embedded in the strong tie would help two individuals to reconnect more easily, even to the 
point of creating a “permanent connection that time apart, on its own, cannot undo.” 
(p.926) By finding that reconnected strong ties as beneficial as current ones, the authors 
suggest that strong ties do not seem to suffer from decay (in contrast to what earlier 
literature had suggested); however, their tests do not account for the actual length of the 
tie’s dormancy period. Especially given that the form of internal social capital studied here 
- shared experience - is one in which the benefits are grounded on the daily interconnected 
routine activities of social actors, we might expect that the passage of time would erode the 
common trust, communication codes and efficiency in routine set embedded in the 
relationship. As Burt puts it, internal social capital may “die of natural causes unless an 
effort is made” (2002:347). In sum, although we might expect the reactivation of shared 
experience to be hindered by the passage of time, we can also posit that stronger ties may 
decay at a slower rate. Thus: 
H4b: Tie strength negatively moderates the effect of the length of the dormancy 
period on diminishing shared experience reactivation.  
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Chapter 3: Exploring the moderating role of demographic 
similarity on the effect of shared experience reactivation 
on newcomers’ performance 
Do employees help or hinder the integration and the performance of new 
organizational members who are demographically similar to them? Despite the 
importance of this question, which may generate a deeper theoretical understanding of 
workplace dynamics and empirically ground effective policies to reduce workers’ 
discrimination, answers to such inquiry have generally been assumed rather than 
empirically explored (Duguid, Loyd, and Tolbert 2010). As observed by Duguid and 
colleagues, the common and general supposition is that employees “serve as advocates 
for demographically similar others” (2010:1). Even if such assumption is reasonable and 
consistent with prior research, definitive empirical answers have rarely been given. The 
few empirical studies that have focused on demographic similarity have mainly focused 
on the evaluation of potential interviewees, showing contradictory results (e.g. Graves 
and Powell 1996; Goldberg 2005; Jost 2001). For instance, in the context of interviewing 
job applicants, Graves and Powell (1996) have found that, ceteris paribus, female 
interviewers rate more favorably female candidates – but at the same time, in a similar 
context, Sacco, Scheu, Ryan, and Schmitt (2003) have found no significant effects either 
for race or gender similarity. In opposition, Goldberg (2005) has demonstrated a 
preference for interviewees of the opposite sex, providing even further doubts 
surrounding the effects of demographic similarity. 
This empirical conundrum seems to suggest not only that more empirical analysis 
on this issue are warranted, but that important moderating effects may be at play and have 
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a profound effect on the mechanisms that link demographic similarity to the individual 
performance of new employees. Hence, the objective of this chapter is to find whether 
demographic similarity amplifies or reduces the positive effect of shared experience 
reactivation on new members’ performance – a mechanism introduced and theorized in 
Chapter 2 - and whether different effects may be expected for members of discriminated 
groups. Understanding whether employees help demographically similar others to 
achieve higher individual performance carries great relevance for policy-making on top 
of its theoretical importance. In fact, such question may be central to the understanding of 
the mechanisms that keep discriminated groups out of the most prestigious occupations, 
and in particular of their ability to use networks to their advantage. Indeed, despite a 
relative scarcity of studies in the area, social network scholars have empirically found 
that network benefits may deeply differ for gender and racial minorities. For instance, 
Burt (1992, 1998) has shown that whereas males enjoy better salaries and quicker 
promotions when placed in favorable network positions, the opposite applies for their 
female colleagues, who are not able to extract the same benefits from the social structure. 
Similarly, Ibarra (1995) showed that networks are less functional in terms of career 
progression for managers belonging to racial minorities than for their white counterparts, 
and that women receive lower network returns than men on their central network 
positions (Ibarra 1992). The common explanation behind these findings is built upon two 
overlapping processes. First, networks are bound by structural constraints. In other 
words, non-discriminated members usually dominate organizational networks both in 
terms of quantity (i.e. sheer numbers) and quality (i.e. hierarchy). The second process is 
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social homophily, i.e. the tendency of individuals to form strong connections with similar 
others. Put together, these two processes offer a plausible explanation as to why women 
and members of racial minorities struggle to reap network benefits: homophily reinforces 
differences in network positions, and therefore the benefits associated with them (Ibarra 
1992). The solution proposed by scholars and policy makers is to spur diversity and 
increase the representation of discriminated groups in organizations by purposively 
recruiting their members in organizations’ upper echelons (Ely 1994; Ibarra 1995). In this 
way, discriminated members would be able to find a higher number of demographically 
similar others, which would in turn reduce the structural constraints faced by new 
members, helping them to reduce the obstacles they face in advancing their careers. 
However, this solution would be favorable only to the extent that individuals belonging to 
discriminated social categories would actually help each other. Thus, studying whether 
this assumption holds is fundamental to understand whether such policy would actually 
be useful to reduce workplace discrimination. 
The positive effects of demographic similarity on shared 
experience reactivation. 
 There are strong reasons to believe that, generally speaking, individuals in 
organizations may have a preference to advocate for their demographically similar new 
colleagues. The strongest evidence is put forward by the similarity-attraction theory 
originally proposed by Byrne (1971), which posits that in general individuals have a 
preference for interacting with others who share their values and beliefs. Without fine-
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grained information about personal attitudes, individuals often use available demographic 
characteristics (e.g. gender, race) to approximate the underlying values. Based on this 
premise, multiple studies have found strong evidence for social homophily, a mechanism 
that predicts that individuals tend to form relations with those who are similar to them. 
Homophily seems to have a strong impact on a wide array of social relationships, as 
individuals tend to create strong bonds with similar others ranging from marriage, to 
friendship, to work relationships (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). These 
tendencies may actually be explained by two separate homophily processes (McPherson 
and Smith-Lovin 1987). Induced homophily refers to homophily created by the 
demographical distribution across social groups. For instance, in a completely 
homogeneous group, individuals will form ties with similar others simply because they 
have no other alternative. A second type of homophily – choice homophily - is instead 
based on individuals’ preferences. In such case, individuals will form relationships with 
others sharing their characteristics for a specific individual choice. I will focus on the 
latter form of homophily as the key mechanism for expecting a positive effect of 
similarity. 
 Dyadic relationships with similar others has been theorized to be beneficial for 
individuals in the work place, one reason being the existence of categorical biases among 
peers and supervisors. For instance, among others, Stauffer and Buckley (2005) have 
shown the relevance of racial bias in supervisory ratings. Whereas the two scholars could 
not discern whether such bias was an outcome of conscious or subconscious 
discrimination, their analysis highlighted that both black and white supervisors rate their 
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racially similar workers more highly. However, other reasons other than categorical bias 
have been theorized to influence positively ties between similar others. According to 
Ibarra (1993), “interpersonal similarity increases ease of communication, improves 
predictability of behavior, and fosters relationships of trust and reciprocity.” (p. 61). This 
also facilitates the creation of informal ties between demographically similar others 
(Lincoln and Jon Miller 1979; Tsui and O'Reilly 1989), which forms the basis through 
which employees find support during their work. In particular, research on mentorship 
has found that ties between similar others create better mentor-protégé’ relationships. 
Racial differences have proven to be an obstacle in the identification between white 
superiors and black workers (Thomas 1993), and similarly differences in gender may be 
an obstacle for women to create and enjoy mentorship with men, due to stereotypes and 
norms regarding cross-gender relationships (Noe 1988). Students of relational 
demography posed additional attention to the effect of demography diversity on 
networks, specifically focusing on the demographic difference in dyads. In their seminal 
study, Tsui and O’Reilly (1989) moved the level of analysis from the overall distribution 
of demographic characteristics of the focal collective to the demographic similarity 
between supervisors and subordinates, thus concentrating their analysis at the dyadic 
level. They found evidence for lower levels of job performance and higher levels of role 
ambiguity the higher the demographic difference between superiors and subordinates, in 
particular for cross-gender dyads. In a subsequent study, Tsui, Egan and O’Reilly (1992) 
again found evidence for a positive effect of homophily on organizational attachment – in 
comparison to her organizational unit, the greater the demographic difference between an 
 37 
 
employee, the lower the resulting organizational attachment. In sum, previous studies 
have proposed that demographic similarity is associated with higher effectiveness (Tsui 
and O’Reilly 1989) and higher levels of social support (Ibarra 1992; South et al. 1982). 
 For these reasons, thus, we might expect that the effect of reactivated shared 
experience on new organizational members’ performance to positively interact with 
demographic similarity. As illustrated in Chapter 2, when joining a new organizational 
setting, employees often face a “reality shock” due to the extreme disconnect between 
their expectations and the need of quickly grasping a new set of work routines, social 
norms and the lack of work experience with their new colleagues. New members need to 
quickly bridge such gaps in order to be accepted as valued contributors in their new work 
setting, and such process may require some time as the expectations of the incumbents 
may be very different from those of the new members. In such cases, the reactivation of 
prior work experience may be of great help. The reactivated contact inside the 
organization can leverage his or her knowledge of the new members’ skills, traits and 
attitudes, brokering such information to other group members, and thus enabling the new 
employee to be socialized more quickly into the new work context. The internal contact 
can also become a role-model and a mentor for the new member, a learning process 
known as “social enrichment” (Castilla 2005). So whereas I expect shared experience 
reactivation to positively influence the performance of a new organizational member, I 
also suggest that such process should be even stronger when triggered between 
demographically similar others, as according to the aforementioned research on 
demographic similarity I expect similar others to share a stronger sense of trust, 
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reciprocity, identification and easiness of communication (Ibarra 1993, Thomas 1993). 
Demographically similar others are more motivated to reciprocally offer help, increasing 
social support for the new member in her new environment (Ibarra 1992) and thus 
generating higher levels of effectiveness (Tsui and O’Reilly 1989). For these reasons, we 
might expect reactivated shared experience among demographically similar individuals to 
have an even stronger effect on new members performance. 
H5: Demographic similarity will amplify the effect of reactivated shared 
experience on new members’ performance. 
The lower impact of shared experience reactivation on new 
members’ performance for demographic groups under value 
threat. 
Whereas some past studies have highlighted the positive effects that demographic 
similarity has on individual performance, not all empirical analyses present in the 
literature support this view. For instance, a study by Jost (2001) has found evidence for a 
negative effect of demographic similarity, and others have found no empirical support for 
the relationship in either direction (Sacco et al. 2003). These mixed results may hint at 
the fact that the similarity-attraction paradigm, although perhaps valid in many contexts, 
may be conditional upon contextual and specific relational factors.  
In particular, researchers point at the fact that members of specific demographic 
groups may be less willing to offer their support and advocate for demographically 
similar others. For instance, in the context of law firms, Ely (1994) found that women do 
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not necessarily support other women. This is especially true in firms whose upper 
echelons were numerically dominated by males – in these contexts, women were less 
likely to identify with other senior women, to use their same-gender senior as role-
models, and in general they perceive relations with other female colleagues as more 
competitive. A similar result was observed by Smith (2005) in her analysis of social 
capital activation among African-American urban poor. In her study a strikingly 81% of 
African-American potential job referrers were not willing to help demographically 
similar members to find a job. Such strong result seems to openly contradict the 
similarity-attraction paradigm, as respondents showed to be highly concerned of whether 
supporting a demographically similar other might affect their reputation on the job. 
Duguid, Loyd and Tolbert (2010) offered a theoretical framework that may help 
to reconcile these counterintuitive results. They suggest that members of a demographic 
group may be more or less inclined to help their demographically similar others 
contingently upon their experience of “value threat”. According to Duguid and 
colleagues, “value threat occurs when an individual sees himself as a potentially valuable 
member but perceives that others will not see him in this way” (p. 3). Thus, value threat 
is not caused by internal self-appraisal, but rather is a “response to perceived external 
appraisals” (p.3). In other words, members of a demographic group are under value threat 
when they perceive third parties to question their value as workers for the specific reason 
of being members of their demographic group.  
The perception of value threat is context-specific. This implies that the same 
demographic group – for instance, women – may perceive different levels of value threat 
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in different professions. Duguid and colleagues (2010) identify three factors that raise the 
level of value threat in a given context: the presence of discriminatory beliefs, low overall 
numerical representation in the profession and high level of occupational prestige.  
In many contexts diffuse and widespread discriminatory beliefs link specific 
observable demographic characteristics – e.g. gender or race – to specific individual 
abilities. These beliefs act as stereotypes, for example associating being female to the 
ability to perform a specific task better or worse, or to specific behavioral tendencies. It is 
important to note that these stereotypes are tied to specific occupations, and therefore 
members of a specific group associated to a demographic characteristic may be more or 
less discriminated in different professions. For instance, under the stereotype that women 
are physically weaker than men, women are more likely to perceive value threat in 
physically intensive jobs. Such general beliefs lower the status of a specific demographic 
category, discriminating between different demographical groups, and automatically 
placing members of discriminated groups at an initial status disadvantage (Ridgeway and 
Walker 1995). These stereotypes generate performance expectations not only for third 
parties, but also for the members of the low status categories themselves, which thus may 
experience higher pressure to perform and in general higher value threat, as they may 
face additional obstacles to prove to be worthwhile members of their collectives. 
Discriminatory beliefs are even more powerful in contexts where the associated 
demographic group is represented in low numbers (Duguid et al. 2010). When a group 
tied to a demographic characteristic is present in small numbers in any given profession it 
may be perceived simply as being not apt to carry out the required tasks – in other words, 
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the small numerical representation itself may act as a discriminatory signal (Ridgeway 
1988). For instance, we might expect women to perceive more value threat in professions 
where there are an overall smaller number of women. The imbalance in the distribution 
of a demographic characteristic may make it an even more salient attribute used to 
classify and evaluate (Cohen and Swim 1995), and thus amplify the stereotyping effects 
of the discriminatory beliefs associated with the group. In other words, “numeric 
minorities may be more prone to assume that others will call into question their value to 
the group” (Duguid et al. 2010:5) 
Third, discriminated individuals face higher value threat in higher prestige work 
groups (Duguid et al. 2010). This is due to the fact that the higher the prestige of the 
given group, the more stereotyped members will feel pressured to demonstrate they are 
valuable parts of such groups. High prestige groups represent a relevant opportunity for a 
discriminated demographic group to disprove the status beliefs associated to their 
demographic category, and instead to prove they have the ability to fit in and belong to 
the higher prestige group. Disidentification with one’s category and self-identification 
with the new, high-prestige group, is basic mechanism through which social mobility is 
achieved, allowing discriminated members to be more regarded and respected, enhancing 
their self-esteem (Duguid et al. 2010). 
The concept of value threat is important because it may lead members of a 
demographic group to be less willing to support demographically similar others (Duguid 
et al. 2010). This preference against other members of their group will be revealed when 
the addition of a new member to the group will increase value threat for the incumbent 
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discriminated members. The addition of a demographically similar other may indeed 
carry some risk to strengthen the stereotypes that incumbent discriminated members have 
been trying to disprove. Incumbents may fear that the new member might behave in a 
way consistent with the stereotypes associated with their demographic characteristics; 
Duguid and colleagues define this risk as collective threat. In such case, incumbent 
discriminated members may withdraw their support from demographically similar others, 
as exemplified by Smith’s analysis of whether African-American workers help black 
unemployed to find a job (2005). The African-American population has been often 
stereotyped as being lazy and thus less productive (Roberts 2005). Smith’s (2005) study 
revealed that black workers’ concern of this stereotype led them to withdraw support 
from their demographically similar others, fearing that the new members would 
strengthen rather than dissipate such beliefs. 
Another potential factor that may raise value threat among members of a 
discriminated demographic group is an accusation of favoritism from the other group 
members. Extending support to demographically similar others may indeed be seen as a 
favor given to a new potential member that otherwise would not be able to prove his 
worth by himself. Such action may backfire on the referrer, as this could be seen as a 
reaffirmation of the negative stereotypes associated to their social category. Thus, such 
favoritism threat may lead members of group under value threat to withdraw support to a 
demographically similar new member of the group (Duguid et al. 2010). Lastly, the 
arrival of a demographically similar other may also trigger a competitive mechanism. If 
the new member outperforms incumbent discriminated members, they might feel their 
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value to be diminished in the eyes of the rest of the collective. Such competitive threat 
may thus push to withdraw support to demographically similar others (Duguid et al. 
2010). This mechanism could well explain why women employed in law firms often 
display competitive (rather than supportive) relations against other women (Ely 1994). 
Whereas in general we might expect the reactivation of shared experience to 
foster the socialization of new organizational members, and thus their performance, 
collective, favoritism and competitive threats may make members under value threat to 
be less willing to support their demographically similar new members.  Thus: 
H6: The effect of shared experience reactivation on new members’ performance 
will be lower for members of a demographic group under value threat. 
The moderating impact of numeric proportion in the focal 
organization on the effect of shared experience reactivation 
between members of a demographic group under value threat. 
 Different elements may positively or negatively moderate the effect of shared 
experience reactivation between members of a demographic group under value threat. In 
particular, the numeric proportion between discriminated and non-discriminated 
employees in the focal organization may be extremely relevant. In fact, whereas Duguid 
et al. (2010) indicate the numerical representation in the overall profession to have a role 
in determining the perceived level of value threat by a specific demographic group, such 
representation may proportionally change from organization to organization. Hence, for 
instance, even if women on average may face a high level of value threat in a profession 
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over-represented by men, those who work in organizations where female numbers are 
relatively higher will be better off than those who are not. 
 The importance of proportions – as defined as the relative numbers of 
demographically different people in an organization – was first theorized by Kanter 
(1977) in her study of “tokenism” in firms. She suggested that male-female interactions 
were dependent upon the proportion of members of both genders in the specific 
collective. Particularly in skewed groups, where discriminated members find themselves 
relatively isolated, individuals become “tokens” – in other words, they become stronger 
symbols of the social category they represent, capturing higher awareness from the other 
group members. Such higher awareness is connected to higher pressure for performance, 
as their behavior becomes more public, and in general more attention is put on the 
tokens’ discrepant characteristic and the associated beliefs. Together, these two factors 
may raise value threat for the members of the demographic group under value threat. The 
smaller the group, in relation to the larger organizational collective, the more the 
discriminated members may be conscious of their demographic characteristic – and its 
associated performance expectations - to be the defining factor to be used as the basis for 
their evaluation. As suggested by Duguid and colleagues (2010), “group members are 
more likely to become conscious of [the demographic characteristic] as a distinguishing 
attribute of individuals and to use it as a basis for categorization and evaluation” (p.5). 
Thus, as the numerical proportion of the group under value threat decreases, the more 
salient the associated demographic traits become, and the higher value threat gets 
perceived by its members. In such case, as previously discussed, employees under value 
 45 
 
threat may perceive higher degrees of collective, favoritism and competitive threats, and 
thus be even less willing to offer support to demographically similar new organizational 
members. We might therefore expect the effect of tie reactivation between members 
under value threat to be stronger the higher the numerical representation of their group is 
in the focal organization. 
H7: The proportion of demographically similar others in the focal collective will 
positively moderate the effect of shared experience reactivation on new members’ 
performance under value threat. 
The moderating impact of relational embeddedness on the effect of 
shared experience reactivation between members of a 
demographic group under value threat. 
As previously theorized, shared experience reactivation between members of a 
demographic group under value threat has a greater impact on the new member 
performance the less the sponsor perceives value threat. We might expect the level of 
threat perceived by the sponsor to decrease the longer the history of interactions between 
the sponsor and the rest of the members of the collective, i.e. the more the sponsor is 
relationally embedded with the rest of the team. This is due to the fact that, as shown by 
prior research, the stereotyping that fuels value threat is stronger during the very initial 
interactions, whereas it tends to weaken with time. Indeed, a story of multiple interactions 
allows for the acquisition of finer-grained information about the other parties, realigning 
initial expectations with actual individuals’ skills and abilities (Harrison, Price, and Bell 
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1998), thus making the stereotyping less prominent as individuals rely on their own direct 
experience rather than on generic status beliefs. Chatman and Flynn ( 2001) have 
similarly found that, even if demographic differences initially lead to non-cooperative 
norms, repeated interactions help groups to get rid of those negative norms. In the context 
of resident surgeons, Kellogg (2009) has found that higher levels of familiarity between 
group members is functional to overcome potential biases related to their status category 
and thus allowing members who would otherwise face discrimination to feel valued parts 
of their collectives. 
For these reasons, I expect a higher level of relational embeddedness between the 
sponsor and the rest of the members of the collective to facilitate the process of tie 
reactivation. The greater sense of familiarity and trust between the sponsor and the rest of 
the group - granted by the higher embeddedness - will allow him to face less pressure 
related to how his performance is judged in relation to his categorical status. Thus, he 
will be more motivated to actively help the new organizational member he is sponsoring 
through the reactivated tie. Consequently, I expect that: 
H8: Sponsors’ relational embeddedness will positively enhance the effect of 
shared experience reactivation on new members’ performance between members 
of a demographic group under value threat. 
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Chapter 4: Methods 
Data Sources: The National Basketball Association. 
I test my hypotheses using longitudinal data on basketball teams’ membership and 
performance. Using sport as a context for research provides scholars with several 
advantages, such as accurately measured data, transparency of strategy and processes, and a 
relatively controlled environment where all teams compete using the same rules and vying 
for the same goals (Wolfe et al. 2005). Scholars have leveraged similar advantages to study 
many organizational phenomena, such as organizational loyalty (Adler and Adler 1988), 
the relationship between pay distribution and performance (Bloom 1999), strategy and 
performance (Wright, Smart, and McMahan 1995), the effect of managerial succession on 
organizational performance (Eitzen and Yetman 1972; Allen, Panian, and Lotz 1979; 
Pfeffer and Alison Davis-Blake 1986), and the contribution of tacit knowledge to 
sustainable competitive advantage (Berman, Down, and Hill, 2002).  
Since sports teams represent a microcosm of society and mirror the world of work 
(Keidell 1987), they “can serve as a heuristic to guide researchers in analyzing, and 
managers in running, organizations” (Wolfe et al., 2005: 184). Teams in organizations have 
many similarities with sport teams (Katz and Koenig 2001; Keidell 1984; Wolfe et al. 
2005): they both strive for high performance, have crises, rely on various types of resources 
(i.e., financial, human, social) to achieve their goals, and share a concern for cooperating 
internally and competing externally, for managing human resources strategically and 
developing appropriate systems and structures (Keidell, 1984; Wright, Smart, and 
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McMahan, 1995). In particular, basketball teams are characterized by strong reciprocal task 
interdependence and high degree of coordination between team members (Thompson 
1967; Berman, Down, and Hill 2002; Keidel 1984). Players continually interact on 
offense, as demonstrated by the continuous back-and-forth flow of the ball among them, 
with the goal of getting it to a teammate who is in a position to score. They also coordinate 
their actions while defending, such as when double-teaming an offensive player and 
covering for each other on defensive breakdowns. Further, offense and defense are 
completely overlapping, and may transition into each other instantaneously. Players are 
usually involved in every play (offense, defense, and transition) and are all in continuous 
movement. These characteristics make a basketball team a tightly coupled system, in which 
each player is coupled to all their teammates in a “fluid, unfolding manner” (Keidel, 1984: 
9), Many organizational teams closely resemble these systems, especially those in fast 
changing environments which require very frequent and close interaction among team 
members: good examples are consulting firms, creative advertising agencies, but also 
firefighting and SWAT teams, and cross-functional teams more generally. Members of 
such teams do not have all the knowledge required to perform complex tasks, which 
requires them to coordinate their actions and mutually adjust to be able to perform their 
collective tasks effectively. Similarly, because of the nature of the tasks performed, the 
flow of information in basketball teams is constant and cooperation widespread (Katz and 
Koenig 2001). All these characteristics make basketball teams a suitable setting for testing 
my hypotheses. 
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Ethnic composition of the National Basketball Association 
The demographic composition of the NBA makes it a particularly suitable context for 
investigating the role of demographic similarity on tie reactivation. In general, the 
literature on demographic similarity and social discrimination has focused on three main 
demographic characteristics – gender, age and race. Since the NBA is a male basketball 
league, discriminatory biases based on gender may not be present in this context. 
Additionally, the vast majority of the players are in the age range 25 to 35, and such 
restricted span makes age an unlikely candidate for demographic discrimination. The 
absence of discriminatory mechanisms based on age and gender makes race a particularly 
interesting element to focus on, especially considering an almost feature of American 
professional basketball – in opposition to most high-status professional settings, in the 
NBA the Caucasian (white) group is the one facing discrimination. The overwhelming 
presence of African American players in the NBA creates an association in the general 
public between players’ ethnic and social origins and their success (Dubrow and Adams, 
2010; May 2009), and creates a discriminatory belief that associates Caucasians’ physical 
abilities with inferior performance on a basketball court. In his analysis of televised 
sports, Bruce (2004) suggests that “in its visual and narrative representations, mediated 
sport naturalizes the popular fascination with and common-sense acceptance of black 
athleticism” (p. 861). It is important to note that these discriminatory beliefs do not 
simply exist among the general population/sports’ audience, but also in the population of 
white athletes (Azzarito and Harrison, 2008). The existence of negative racial stereotypes 
in sports (and in basketball, specifically) has been document though lab experiments in 
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multiple occasions (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling and Darley, 1999; Stone, Perry and Darley, 
2010), and such stereotype threat among Caucasian players may well be at the base of a 
general value threat. The presence of race-based stereotypes has made American 
basketball a relevant context where to study race discrimination (e.g. Johnson and 
Marple, 1973; Kanazawa and Funk 2001; Gius and Johnson, 1998), particularly in 
relation to salaries (Hamilton, 1997). However, discriminatory dynamics between players 
have rarely been analyzed, especially in relation to their socialization and performance, 
even if lately a racial bias has been found between referees and players (Price and 
Wolfers, 2010). 
Sample description 
The NBA is the world’s most famous and competitive basketball league, and currently 
comprises 30 clubs (or ‘franchises’) and several hundred players. Publicly available game-
level data start in 1985, and so my sample is composed of player-game level data gathered 
over a 26 year period (1985-2011). Since this study is primarily concerned with the 
performance of new organizational members, my analysis focuses on the 5,866 instances in 
which a player joined a new team in that time. An important property of this sample is that, 
on average, NBA players experienced three (2.91) such transitions during the course of 
their careers, allowing me to analyze multiple organizational transitions for each individual 
player while controlling for individual constant unobservable characteristics by including 
players’ fixed effects in my estimation strategy. Moreover, given that an NBA season 
includes 82 games, the analysis of game-level performance allows me to study the 
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evolution of individual performance within seasons, effectively accounting for the effect of 
socialization (Chen 2005). Thus, over the 26 seasons, my total data sample includes 
225,307 player-game observations. 
Dependent variable 
Individual performance. The availability of precise measurements of players’ 
performance is one the most valuable factors in using sports data. In most other settings, 
detailed objective measures of individual performance are very rare (Castilla, 2005). 
Basketball leagues keep detailed accounts of a variety of players’ statistics, including shots 
taken, points scored, rebounds, steals, blocks and turnovers, and the NBA includes such 
statistics in a single index called NBA efficiency, which summarizes players’ performance. 
This index provides an accurate estimation of a player’s productivity when on court, and 
has the added advantage that their performance can be calculated for each stint, game or 
season, hence providing a measure of performance in various time-spans. It is important to 
note that, despite its name, NBA efficiency is not standardized by the number of minutes 
each player spends on the court – in other words, this indicator is highly correlated with the 
time players are deployed on the court for. Whereas this could be seen as a limitation, the 
allocation of the minutes on the court is a decision made by the head coach. Since the 
number of playable minutes per game is fixed, a coach’s decision to allocate minutes 
parallels the resource allocation processes that are usually present in most hierarchical 
organizations. Therefore, “receiving” more playing time can be itself considered a measure 
of performance, as we should expect coaches to deploy their best players for the longer 
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periods possible. Hence, I also considered minutes played per game as an alternative 
measure of individual performance, 
Independent Variables 
Shared experience reactivation. The focal point of this study is to examine the 
effects to shared experience reactivation. In order to measure shared experience, I look at 
whether two players were employed in the same club for a whole season during a moving 
window of ten years preceding the focal observation. Thus, if player A joins club Alpha in 
2006, I calculate if he shared a common playing season with at least one of his new team 
members during the period 1996-2005. If so, the dummy variable tie reactivation takes a 
value of 1, and 0 otherwise. While this dichotomous operationalization captures the 
presence of at least one reactivated tie, a new team member may have the opportunity of 
reactivating several shared experience ties during his socialization. For instance, player A 
might have shared a common work experience with player B in team Beta in 2000, and 
another one with player C in team Charlie in 1998. To capture the magnitude of this 
phenomenon, I additionally use a continuous version of my tie reactivation indicator (tie 
reactivation continuous) that counts the number of ties a newcomer reactivates when 
joining a new club. Additionally, players might reactivate ties with coaches as well, as they 
might have worked under their current new coach under different circumstances. To 
capture this effect, I also consider re-activation between players and coaches in my 
operationalization, and add a dummy coach reactivation to indicate whether the reactivated 
tie is between player and coach. 
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Strength of tie reactivation and tie dormancy. My longitudinal sample and the 
consistency of its measurement allow to operationalize the passage of time and its impact in 
terms of tie strength and tying dormancy. Figure 4 graphically represent different 
reactivated ties, and the role of time in determining their effect. 
-------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the past life-spans of four different shared experience ties that 
get reactivated at time t. In order to account for their effect at time t, it is important to 
account for both their past activity and dormancy period. Solid lines in the Figure 4 
represent periods in which the ties were active (i.e. when sponsor and newcomer were 
playing together in their previous team), while dotted lines times when the two players 
were not in the same team. For instance, the two players composing Tie A played together 
for the same amount of time as Tie B players, but interrupted their collaboration earlier in 
time, and hence their tie remained dormant for a longer period. Differently, Tie B and C 
have remained dormant for the same amount of time, but Tie C player had a longer 
collaboration beforehand.  Tie D players, instead, reactivated their tie twice during their 
careers. These simplified examples denote the importance of independently 
operationalizing three different time-based effects – a) tie strength, in terms of how long 
the two players played together in the past for; b) tie dormancy, as the period in which the 
tie has not been active; and c) potential career-based effects, that indicate whether 
reactivation earlier in the players’ career may be more or less beneficial. Thus, in order to 
test the effects of tie strength on shared experience reactivation, I count the number of 
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seasons the new team member and the ‘sponsor’ played together in the past. If players A 
and B shared four seasons in common between 1996 and 2000, the variable strength of tie 
reactivation is given the value four. This measure follows similar approaches adopted in 
the literature on shared experience (by, e.g., Reagans et al., 2005; Espinosa et al, 2007). In 
a similar fashion tie dormancy is measured as the sum of the number of seasons in which 
the two players have not played together since their tie was last active. So in the previous 
case, if the reactivation occurs in 2006, tie dormancy will have a value of six, as 2000 was 
the last year in which the two players were playing together. It is important to note that, in 
the occurrences when multiple tie reactivations happen, each reactivated tie potentially has 
different values of strength of tie reactivation and tie dormancy. In such case, I adopt the 
highest value of tie strength, and the lowest value of tie dormancy, under the assumption 
that the newcomer will utilize the most recent and strongest tie to maximize his benefits. 
Finally, in order to control for potential career-based effects, I include tenure in the 
NBA as an indicator capturing the number of seasons spent in the NBA by the newcomer. 
Controlling for the career trajectory of players is particularly critical as, mechanically, more 
experienced newcomers are more likely to reactivate a tie, due to the fact that they have 
been exposed to a higher number of teams and colleagues over their career. 
Sponsors’ relational embeddedness. Chapter 2 investigates the theoretical 
mechanisms that may enable highly embedded sponsors to have a greater impact on 
newcomers’ performance. Thus, I define sponsors’ relational embeddedness as the average 
tie strength of the shared experience ties between the sponsor and the other old-timers. Tie 
strength is operationalized as the number of seasons each dyad has spent together in the 
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previous 10 years. More formally: 
     ∑ −−=
j
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)1()1( βα   [1] 
where REi represents the value of relational embeddedness for sponsor I, j represents any 
possible dyad of players (including the coach) who played at least one season together in 
the past 10 years, α is a time discount factor (10%), and β represents how many seasons 
ago the players in the dyad played together. Time discount α accounts for the fact that we 
could expect older shared experiences to have less impact than newer ones (i.e., having 
played together ten years ago should have less impact than having done so during the last 
season). α acts as a compound discount factor for every season past the current one. Thus, 
in an imaginary Club Alpha with only three members (A, B and C) who have played 
together before - A and B for the last three seasons, with C joining only one year ago – A 
would have a relational embeddedness of  2.71 (A-Bt-3 = .64, A-Bt-2 = .80, A-Bt-1 = 1, and 
A-Ct-1 = 1). 
Race and demographic indicators. I followed recent studies in the 
operationalization of demographic characteristics. Price and Wolfers (2010) use skin 
complexion as a visual determinant for operationalizing race, subdividing the NBA 
players’ population into black and white players. Asian and Hispanics and other non-white, 
non-black racial groups are not highly represented in the NBA, and will be imprecisely 
considered as “white” in my analysis (for a similar operationalization, see Price and 
Wolfers, 2010). Data on players’ race was obtained from www.databasebasketball.com, 
with the addition of manual coding based on players’ and coaches’ images collected from 
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www.nba.com and www.google.com. 
Control variables 
Human capital. Another benefit of using sports data is the possibility of adopting a 
clearer distinction between human and social capital, the lack of which has plagued current 
research on social capital (Payne et al., 2011). Since human capital is considered relatively 
constant over time, I employ player-level fixed effects to control for the effects of talent as 
an alternative strategy. However, in order to account for fluctuations in skills and talent, I 
also include the prior season Player Efficiency Rating (PER) in my regressions as a control 
for human capital. Inspired by sabermetrics and created by statistician John Hollinger 
(Hollinger, 2005), PER provides a more precise view of players’ performance. The PER 
does not simply add or subtract individual statistics, but weights them, standardizing them 
by minutes played and controlling for different team strategies (which might affect the 
number of opportunities each player has to score).  
 Time. Game-level data allows me to explore how the effects of tie reactivation 
change during the socialization period. Since the NBA season consists of 82 games, I 
included the following two variables to account for the passage of time. Games played 
represents the total of actual games played by the focal newcomer during the current 
season, and indicating the unfolding of the socialization period of the player. Game number 
is a numerical progressive indicator of the match under analysis, and so indicates whether it 
is played early or late during the season. 
 Age and individual experience. I used other individual control variables to account 
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for potential confounding effects. It was particularly important to include players’ age and 
experience in the league, as both variables are likely to be correlated to the likelihood of 
reactivating a tie. In fact, older players, as well as players that have longer careers, are more 
likely to have played with a higher number of other players in the past. Since the NBA is a 
closed system, it then becomes more likely for them to reactivate one or more ties when 
they transition to a new team. Controlling for these two factors is thus very important for 
the reliability of my analysis. 
 Team size and past team performance. Two team-level variables are likely to be 
correlated with the chance of reactivating a tie. The first is team size – measured as the total 
number of players in the team. Bigger teams create more opportunities for tie reactivation, 
for the simple reason of having more players. Since I investigate tie reactivation as past 
shared experience between a newcomer and an incumbent, a higher number of incumbents 
makes it more likely for a tie to be reactivated. At the same time, larger teams might be 
characterized by a higher degree of internal competition, creating an additional hurdle for 
newcomers to perform at higher levels. 
 In a similar vein, I control for the focal team performance in the previous year. 
Team that perform worse are more likely to change their roster composition, hence 
increasing the overall number of newcomers (and, consequently, internal competition) and 
decreasing the chance for a tie to be reactivated, due to incumbents’ turnover. Moreover, 
change in the roster is likely to affect the level of sponsors’ relational embeddedness, which 
is likely to go down with increased turnover. I control for both potential confounding 
effects by including team size and team performance in the previous year in all my 
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regression models. 
Empirical strategy 
I employed multivariate regression analysis to test my hypotheses, adopting 
different estimation procedures to ensure the robustness of my findings. My main models 
adopt an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) approach, including individual-level fixed effects 
(Greene 2008, Castilla 2007). Employing individual fixed-effect estimations in my context 
leverages important characteristics of my data, in particular the fact that players often 
experiences multiple transitions over their careers. This allows me to control for all the 
constant individual-level effects, including individual experience before the NBA, coaching 
exposure during high school and college, physical characteristics and overall level of 
basketball talent. A statistically significant Hausman test (p < .001) reveals fixed-effects to 
be preferable to random-effects, due to the systematic difference in their estimated 
coefficients. Standard errors were adjusted by introducing clustering-correction at the level 
of the players’, and using Huber-White estimators of variance (White 1980). Results also 
proved to be robust when including autoregressive disturbances of order one. I employed 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to evaluate model fit. BIC can be used to 
compare model fit across different regression models, where lower values of BIC should be 
preferred over bigger ones. 
 My empirical strategy analyzes newcomers’ performance at the game (match) level. 
This allows me to compare, within newcomers, matches in season in which the newcomer 
does not reactivate a shared experience tie with matches in seasons where such tie does 
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exist. Figure 5 depicts an graphical representation of my data. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 5 presents an illustration of an exemplified career of a generic player and 
his team affiliation over three years (from the left to the right). Each year is subdivided 
into 10 games (G1-G10). For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that our generic 
player is employed in every single game. My level of analysis is at the game – in other 
words, I estimate a players’ performance in each single game. 
In my example, the focal player is  a newcomer in every single year, as he moves 
from Team Alpha to Team Beta at his second year, and over to Team Delta on his third 
year. Moreover, he experiences a transition to a new organization in the middle of his 
second year, when he switches to Team Gamma. His tenure at Team Gamma is 
characterized by a tie reactivation (signaled by an “R” in Figure 5). Thus, I am interested 
in understanding if the reactivated tie experienced when at Team Gamma has a positive 
effect on his performance. The estimated coefficients for tie reactivation will then explain 
by how much reactivation impacts his performance in comparison to games played in 
situations where such tie did not exists (Team Alpha, Team Beta and Team Delta). I 
present my results in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Statistical Analyses and Results 
 This chapter illustrated my statistical analysis and presents my regression models. 
I will start by briefly presenting the descriptive statistics of my sample and proposing 
some initial considerations. The rest of the chapter is divided in two major sections, 
following the two theoretical frameworks proposed in chapter 2 and chapter 3, 
respectively. Tables 2 through 5 contain the results of my regression models used to 
empirically investigate the first set of hypothesis presented in chapter 2 (H1-H4b), which 
focus on studying the effects of tie reactivation and exploring several moderators, 
including tie strength, the sponsors’ relational embeddedness and tie dormancy. I then 
shift the focus on exploring the role of demographic similarity in tables 6 to 10, where I 
try to understand which factors lead members of discriminated groups to help each other 
or not. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and the bivariate correlation table for the 
main variables. 
 -------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The average age of newcomers is 26.15 years, and their average tenure in the 
NBA is about 4 seasons. Newcomers play on average 30 games for their new team. The 
correlation matrix reveals an unexpected initial finding. The tie reactivation seems not to 
be significantly correlated with individual performance, casting doubts on the 
relationship between tie reactivation and performance. I will introduce my multivariate 
analysis to explore further this initial finding. 
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Testing the effects of tie reactivation on newcomers’ performance 
Basic performance effect, and socialization trajectory (H1a and H1b) 
 The multivariate regression analysis presented in Table 2 explores these 
preliminary results further, providing statistical support for Hypotheses H1a and H1b.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The first model (2A) reports the estimation of a controls-only model. The 
coefficients of the control variables generally behave according to expectations. The 
indicator for human capital (PER previous season) is statistically significant (p < .001) and 
positively related to players’ performance in the current year. As expected, more talented 
players tend to perform better when joining a new team. It is important to note that such 
effect is netted of player-level unobserved heterogeneity. This implies that all my statistical 
analysis account for both dispositional talents (i.e. innate abilities) and acquired talent (i.e. 
the change in skill level over one’s career). The positive and significant coefficients for 
number of games played in season suggests new organizational members undergo a 
learning process – as expected, the more games they play with their new team, the better 
they perform, although their abilities seem to decline during the season (p < .001), perhaps 
due to deterioration in their levels of physical fitness, or perhaps because coaches tend to 
give newcomers less playing time as the season approaches its end. Age also seems to have 
a negative effect on performance, which becomes statistically significant (p < .01) only in 
 62 
 
those models that additionally consider my explanatory variables (from 2C to 2G). The 
effects of team size and team performance (prior season) also merit attention. Team size is 
positively related to newcomers’ performance (p < 0.001), and effect that could potentially 
be explained by the lower degree of competition. Teams that acquire more players tend to 
be worse, and in such conditions newcomers are more likely to emerge as substantial 
contributors to the team. A similar explanation can be given to the negative coefficient for 
team performance (prior season) (p < 0.001). Since we might expect team performance to 
be autocorrelated, the coefficient seems to point at the fact that it is harder for newcomers 
to play significant amounts of minutes in better teams. 
 Model 2B incorporates the main explanatory variable tie reactivation 
(dichotomous) to test my first hypothesis (H1a). Such operator is an indicator variable that 
assumes the value of 1 when the newcomer reactivates at least one tie with his new team 
members. In opposition to my theoretical expectations, the effect for reactivated past shared 
experience seems not to be statistically different from zero (p > .05). To further explore this 
unexpected result, I have investigated whether the effect of tie reactivation may be 
dependent on the value of other covariates. The introduction of an interaction effect 
between tie reactivation and experience in the NBA reveals to be significant and negative (p 
< 0.001), and drastically improves the overall model fit (a drop of 1,532 points in BIC). 
These results seem to suggest that tie reactivation does indeed matter (H1a), but mostly for 
newcomers that are early in their careers. An explanation may be the existence of a learning 
process through which players, throughout the evolution of their career, acquire knowledge 
and skills that enable them to transition more easily into new working environments, even 
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without the help of an organizational sponsor. This seems to be an even stronger proof of 
the theoretical mechanisms on which hypothesis 1a is based. 
 Models 2D-2G provide empirical support for H1b, which posited that the effect of 
tie reactivation would dwindle along the socialization period. The socialization period can 
be measured by two different indicators – either by operationalizing it with time (within 
season) or with # of games played in season. Whereas the two variables are highly 
correlated (.71), they indicate two slightly different processes. The former is an absolute 
metric of time – which indicates at what point in time the game under consideration is 
played. The latter counts the number of games played by the newcomer. So, for instance, a 
for player who joins the team mid-way through the season the time indicator might be high, 
but the number of games played indicator may be low. Thus, I decided to test H1b 
considering both specifications, selectively entering interaction terms with both variables 
and tie reactivation in Models 2D and 2E. Both terms are negative and statistically 
significant (p < 0.05), suggesting empirical evidence for H1b. However, it is theoretically 
relevant to determine which time-based process better captures the socialization effect. I 
thus enter both interaction terms in Model 2F. The interaction term between tie reactivation 
and time (within season) seems to provide a better explanation of the variance, while the 
interaction term between tie reactivation and number of games played loses statistical 
significance. I will discuss this finding in my conclusions. 
 Finally, in order to relax the assumption of linearity of the effect of time, I split the 
tie reactivation dummy into three components, depending on when the focal game is 
played in the season. This allows me to directly compare the strength of the tie reactivation 
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effect between the first and second halves of the season, as well as with playoff games. As 
expected, a comparative F-test shows that the effect of tie reactivation is stronger in the 
first half of the season in comparison to the second (p < 0.01), as suggested by H1b. 
However, by comparing the tie reactivation effect between playoff time and the second half 
of the season, it is worthwhile noting that the former is higher than the latter (p < 0.01). I 
will comment on this finding in my conclusions. 
Testing the moderation effects of tie strength and tie decay 
The regression analyses presented in Table 3 present empirical evidence for 
hypotheses H2, H4a and H4b. Since H2 and H4b both revolve around the effects of tie 
strength, I decided to group and present the results of these hypotheses together. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 2 posits that the performance effect of a reactivated tie is proportional to 
its past strength. In order to test such hypothesis, I include two dummy variables for tie 
reactivation in Model 3A, differentiating them on the basis of tie strength. Tie reactivation 
(high tie strength) assumes a value of 1 when the tie strength of the reactivated tie is above 
average, while Tie reactivation (low tie strength) represents activations of below-average 
strength. A comparison of the BIC criterion between Model 3A and the baseline model 
indicates a noteworthy increase in model fit, indicating that differentiating tie reactivation 
by tie strength greatly increase the model’s explanatory power. As expected, the two effects 
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are positive and significant (p < 0.001), and a statistical comparison between their 
magnitude reveals that high strength reactivations have a bigger impact on newcomers’ 
performance than low strength reactivation. The difference between the two coefficients is 
statistically significant (F-test: p < 0.01), thus statistically supporting my second 
hypothesis.  
 Models 3B and 3C present the effects of time on the tie reactivation process. First, I 
investigate the role of tie dormancy on the effect of tie reactivation on newcomers’ 
performance (H4a). This hypothesis posits that ties that remained dormant for a shorter 
period should experience less decay in their embedded social capital, and thus provide 
stronger effect on performance when reactivated. Similarly to what I have done for H2, I 
introduce in Model 3B two dummy variables for tie reactivation, differentiating between 
reactivated tie with below average dormancy period (low tie dormancy) and above average 
dormancy (high tie dormancy). As expected, the two types of reactivation have a positive 
effect on performance (p < 0.001). A comparison between the two effects is required in 
order to find evidence to support H4a. Low dormancy reactivation displays a higher 
coefficient than high dormancy reactivation, as proposed by H4a, but such difference is not 
statistically different (p > 0.05). Moreover, in comparison to the baseline model, Model 3B 
does not provide a better fit, as displayed by the higher BIC score. Thus, despite going in 
the expected direction, the magnitude of the difference between high and low dormancy 
reactivation does not provide statistical evidence to support H4a. 
 Finally, Model 3C empirically explores hypothesis 4b, which suggests that stronger 
ties should decay at a slower rate than weaker ties. Whereas reactivated ties on average do 
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not show decay (as discussed in the previous paragraph), it may still be possible that strong 
and weak ties may differently be affected by the passage of time. In order to empirically 
test for such possibility, I introduce four dummy variables in Model 3C, covering all the 
possible combinations between high and low strength and high and low dormancy. For the 
sake of clarity, I will refer to the numbers placed next to the coefficients when discussing 
their effects (for instance, (1) refers to high-strength high-dormancy tie reactivation). As 
we should expect, all the coefficients are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), 
indicating that all reactivated ties have, in absolute, a positive effect on newcomers’ 
performance. In order to test for H4b, we have to investigate their relative magnitude. In 
particular, H4a predicts that the effect for tie dormancy will be stronger for weak ties, in 
comparison to strong ones. In terms of my analysis, this means that the difference between 
(4) and (3) should be positive and greater than the one between (2) and (1) – in other 
words, dormancy should be more relevant for weak ties. Yet again, preliminary evidence 
seem to suggest that this may be the case – the coefficients do indeed behave in the 
expected manner – but fail to provide statistical evidence. In fact, there is no reliable 
statistical difference between (4) and (3) and between (2) and (1) – so they are both not 
distinguishable from zero. The analysis of model fit via BIC scores seem again to prove the 
same result. While the BIC for Model 3C is smaller than the baseline model (-31), it is not 
smaller than model (3A). This implies that splitting the tie strength-based dummies into 
high and low dormancy does not add any additional specification to my analysis. In 
synthesis, I could not find any statistical evidence for hypothesis 4b. 
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Testing the moderation effect of sponsors’ relational embeddedness 
I investigate the empirical support for hypothesis 3 (H3) in the following table (Table 4). 
Hypothesis 3 concerns the role of the sponsors’ relational embeddedness on the 
performance of the newcomer. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
My approach to test H3 is similar to what I employed for H2 and H4a. Model 4A 
included two dummies for tie reactivation, separated by the relative value of the 
sponsors’ relational embeddedness. Tie reactivation (sponsors’ high embeddedness) 
indicate reactivations characterized by an above-average value of sponsors’ relational 
embeddedness, while tie reactivation (sponsors’ low embeddedness) capture the effects 
of reactivations below-average in sponsors’ relational embeddedness. Both indicators are 
positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), as expected. Model 4A also displays a 
significant improvement in model fit in relation to the baseline model (difference in BIC: 
-41). Comparing the magnitude of the two coefficients will prove whether reactivations 
characterized by high sponsors’ embeddedness have a stronger effect than the lower 
counterpart. Indeed, the former has a bigger effect than the latter, with the support of a 
comparative F-test (p < 0.001), providing statistical support for the role of the relational 
embeddedness of the sponsor. H3 is thus supported. 
 The following models 4B and 4C explore whether the effect of relational 
embeddedness of the sponsor is dependent upon the internal structure of the team 
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network. In particular, I decided to explore whether the embeddedness in a specific 
subpart of the network matters more or less in terms of newcomers’ performance. I thus 
decided to alternatively consider the relational embeddedness with the core and the 
periphery of the network. I operationalized the two subsections based on the average 
minutes played by the team members in a game during the focal season. If a team 
member played more than 26 minutes per-game was considered a member of the core, or 
of the periphery otherwise (a sensitivity analysis revealed no major discrepancies when 
alternative cut-offs where considered). Thus, I have calculated the sponsors’ relational 
embeddedness by core and periphery only, and then included dummy variables for high 
and low relational embeddedness with core and periphery in Models 4B and 4C. In both 
models, the dummies for tie reactivation at various levels of relational embeddedness had 
positive and significant effects (p < 0.001). However, the difference between high and 
low sponsors’ relational embeddedness was statistically significant (p < 0.01) only when 
the core of the network was considered (Model 4B), while it was not dissimilar in the 
case of the periphery (Model 4C). The implications will be discussed in the conclusion 
section. 
 A potential confounding factor of the effect of the sponsors’ relational 
embeddedness could be the sponsors’ tenure. The two variables are highly correlated, and 
it is easy to understand why – members who spend more time with a team are more likely 
to be more relationally embedded. Despite being numerically similar, the two variables 
have distinctive theoretical implications. Tenure captures seniority, and thus is likely to 
indicate social status. Instead, relational embeddedness is an indicator of social capital 
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and trust. To examine whether the effect of the latter is separate from the former, I first 
explore the role of sponsors’ tenure on the performance effects of tie reactivation (Model 
4D). Similarly to the previous models, I introduce two dummy variables to capture 
sponsors’ high and low tenure (in relation to the mean). The coefficients for the two 
indicators are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.001), in line with the prior 
results. An analysis of their coefficients reveal that reactivations made possible by high 
tenured sponsors’ have a stronger effect than those featured by low tenured sponsors, but 
the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant (p > 0.05). 
Moreover, the overall model fit is comparable to the baseline model (BIC difference: +1), 
indicating that including indicator variables based on the sponsors’ tenure does not 
improve the descriptive power of our model. Tenure does not seem to have a relevant 
impact on the effects of tie reactivation. 
 While Model 4D suggest that tenure does not play a major role, the final model of 
Table 4 (Model 4E) tests the effect of the sponsors’ relational embeddedness by 
controlling for their tenure. In order to achieve this, I introduced four indicator variables 
in Model 4E, for each combination of sponsors’ high and low relational embeddedness 
and tenure. Hypothesis 3 would be confirmed if a positive difference in the magnitude of 
the coefficients exists across different levels of relational embeddedness, while keeping 
tenure constant. In other words, coefficient (1) should be bigger than (2), and (3) bigger 
than (4). Indeed the results hold, even if only the latter difference carries statistical 
reliability (p < 0.08). On the other hand, tenure seems not to have an effect. Coefficients 
(1) and (3) are virtually identical, and (2) and (4) only slightly different, showing that 
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changes in tenure – while keeping relational embeddedness constant - do not have an 
impact on newcomers’ performance. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the additional 
specification – while better than the baseline model – does not advance model fit in 
comparison to Model 4A (BIC: +30). In sum, the data provides sufficient statistical 
evidence for supporting hypothesis 3.  
Robustness tests: Multiple tie reactivations 
I ran additional regression models to strengthen the evidence provided in the 
previous sections. In particular, I was interested in investigating the role played by 
multiple tie reactivations, and further explore the relation between tie reactivation and 
experience in the NBA. Table 5 presents such analyses. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 The analyses presented in Tables 2 to 4 used a dichotomized operationalization of 
tie reactivation, using a dummy variable that indicated the presence of at least one 
reactivated tie. However, multiple ties can be reactivated at the same time for any specific 
newcomer. A descriptive analysis reveals that 25% of the overall instances of tie 
reactivation are indeed multiple. Whereas I did not explicitly theorized the performance 
effect of multiple ties vis-à-vis a single one, there is no reason to believe that the 
reactivation of multiple ties may indeed prove to be more effective than a single instance. 
Thus, in Model 5A I introduce a continuous operationalization of tie reactivation – a 
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variable that counts the number of reactivated ties that are present in the team. The 
coefficient for this alternative specification is positive and significant (p < 0.001), 
proving that the effect on newcomers’ performance of ties in addition to the first 
substantially stack up. 
The following question regards the rate of returns of multiple reactivated ties. 
Depending on alternative theoretical explanations (which I will consider in the discussion 
section), the marginal rate of returns of additional reactivated ties could be constant, 
positive or negative. I empirically explore this question in Model 5B, where I include a 
quadratic term for the continuous operator of tie reactivation. Such coefficient proves to 
be positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05), revealing that tie reactivation has a 
positive marginal rate of return, as shown by Figure 6: 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
  
Figure 6 displays the relationship between tie reactivation (continuous) and 
performance. The quadratic effect is not particularly strong, but it is important to note 
that its inclusion substantially increases model fit (BIC: -53), revealing that the quadratic 
specification of the model indeed provides a better description of the relationship 
between tie reactivation and performance. I will discuss the theoretical relevance of such 
finding in the next chapter. 
In Model 5C I further discriminate between types of ties by looking at 
reactivation with the coach vs. reactivation with other players. Coach-players relations 
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are substantially different from the one between peers (player-to-player), the former 
being more hierarchical and defined by a formal role structure. Thus, I explore whether 
reactivating the two have differing effects on newcomers’ performance. I do so by 
including two new explanatory variables in Model 5C – tie reactivation (sponsor is 
coach) and tie reactivation (sponsor is player). The former is a dummy variable that 
assumes the value of 1 if the current head coach of the team reactivated a tie with the 
focal newcomer. The latter is akin to the continuous operationalization of tie reactivation, 
but only considers those sponsors’ that are players (not coaches). Model 5C shows that 
both coefficients for coaches and players sponsors’ are positive and statistically 
significant (p < 0.001) – as expected, both kinds of reactivations provide performance 
benefits. A comparative analysis of the magnitude of the two coefficients reveals that the 
effect of reactivations with players’ is stronger than the one with coaches, albeit without 
statistical support (p > 0.05). Still, I consider the result to be noteworthy, as there are 
reasons to believe that reactivations with coaches might be worth more. Again, I will 
discuss this finding in my concluding chapter. 
Hypothesis H1b posited that the effect on performance of tie reactivation should 
be stronger earlier in the socialization period. The dichotomous analysis presented in this 
chapter provided support for such hypothesized relation, which was additionally explored 
in Model 5D by using the continuous version of the operationalization for tie reactivation. 
I did so by including an interaction term between tie reactivation (continuous) and time 
within season. Such coefficient proved to be statistically significant and negative (p < 
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0.05), yet again confirming that the effect for tie reactivation is stronger earlier in the 
basketball season. The interaction effect is displayed in Figure 7.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The interaction between tie reactivation (continuous) and time within season 
displays an interesting pattern. Whereas the effect of multiple reactivations stack up, 
becoming stronger as the number of ties increases, the overall time trend tends in the 
opposite direction. In other words, the higher the number of reactivated ties, the stronger 
the effect at the beginning of the season, but also the smaller the marginal effect as the 
season progresses. 
Exploring the effects of demographic similarity on tie reactivation 
Testing the effect of demographic similarity 
Tables 6 to 10 report my statistical analyses on the effects of demographic 
similarity on the performance outcomes of tie reactivation. I present some initial 
exploratory models in Table 6, together with evidence to evaluate hypothesis 5. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
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First, I am interested in understanding – in general - whether white or black 
players benefit more from tie reactivation. Despite not explicitly hypothesizing a race-
based effect, my assumption on the stronger degree of discrimination faced by white 
players leads me to expect that white newcomers would benefit more from the presence 
of a sponsor during their socialization than black newcomers. Thus, in Model 6A I 
introduced two dummy variables based on the race of the newcomer. Tie reactivation 
(white newcomer) takes a value of 1 when the newcomer reactivating a tie is white, and 0 
if not. Similarly, I introduce an indicator for black newcomers (tie reactivation – black 
newcomer). It is important to note that this initial analysis does not discriminate between 
the sponsors’ race. As expected, both white and black players benefit from tie 
reactivation (p < 0.001). A differential F-test between the magnitude of the two 
coefficients reveals that white players tend to benefit more, on average, from tie 
reactivation (p < 0.05), confirming that my initial assumption related to their greater 
integration difficulties holds. 
My second exploratory analysis moves the focus on the race of the sponsors. I 
apply the same approach seen in Model 6A to Model 6B, where I investigate whether 
black or white sponsors’ have a greater impact on newcomers’ performance. Three 
indicator variables individually capture whether the sponsors’ are white, black or mixed. 
The third category captures those instances in which multiple tie reactivations occurred, 
but the set of sponsors’ were not homogeneous. Sponsors of different races seem to 
equally impact newcomers’ performance, as revealed by a comparative F-test between 
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the magnitudes of the three positive coefficients (p > 0.05). Thus, at least on average, 
race seems not to affect the role played by the sponsors’ in the tie reactivation process. 
After investigating the role of race separately, in Model 6C I move on to analyze 
whether reactivated dyads of the same race (homophilous ties) tend to produce higher 
performance outputs than dyads of different races (heterophilous ties), as predicted by 
hypothesis 5 (H5). Once again, in order to clearly separate and compare the effect of 
homophilous vs. heterophilous ties, I decided to introduce a third category (mixed tie) in 
those instances where the set of sponsors’ was not completely white or black. Model 6C 
does not provide empirical support for H5. In fact, while both indicators for homophilous 
and heterophilous reactivated ties are positive and significant (p < 0.001), the difference 
of their coefficients is not statistically significant (p > 0.05). Hence, the notion that 
homophilous ties produce higher outputs finds no empirical evidence. 
Testing the role of value threat, and tie reactivation between members 
of the discriminated group 
With Table 6, my analysis on demographic similarity began by considering the 
role played by race on newcomers and sponsors. Then I moved to investigating whether 
reactivations between players of the same race had a bigger effect on performance, but 
without discriminating by race, i.e. without testing whether reactivations between black 
players have a stronger effect than reactivations between white players. This will then be 
my focus on the following analyses. Results illustrated by Table 7 are based not simply 
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based on race similarity, but distinguish between newcomers and sponsors’ membership 
in the discriminated group. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 7 specifies tie reactivation effects within and across race groups. I 
introduced a dummy variable for each possible race-based combination between 
newcomer and sponsor(s). As discussed before, I specify the sponsors as being “mixed” 
when multiple activations occur, with sponsors’ of difference race. This allows me to 
more distinctively isolate effects across demographic groups. Model 7A estimates such 
indicators. All the tie reactivation variables are statistically significant and with a positive 
effect (p < 0.001), as expected. The fact that tie reactivations help newcomers, 
independently from their race and from their sponsors’ race, is consistent with my overall 
theorization. Defining reactivations by race drastically improves the model fit (BIC: -
131), an initial indication that specifying differences in race improves our understanding 
of the phenomenon under study. 
 Hypothesis six (H6) posits that, due to value threat, sponsors’ of the discriminated 
group are lest vested in helping other members of their group. In order to statistically test 
such hypothesis, I would expect white newcomers to have stronger benefits when their 
reactivated sponsor is black rather than white. Indeed, the effect for the white-black dyad 
is stronger than the one for the white-white dyad. The difference, however, is not 
statistically significant (p > 0.05), thus failing to find initial support for H6. 
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 However, the white-white reactivations may be strongly influenced by the number 
of other white players present in the team, as suggested by hypotheses 7. Sponsors 
integrated in a team with a higher number of demographically similar others may be less 
prone to face value-based threats. I thus introduce in Model 7B an interaction between 
the number of white players in the team and the effect for the white-white tie reactivation. 
Despite improving my overall model fit (BIC: -76), such interaction is not significant. 
Again, there seem to be no support for H7. 
Considering that perception of value-threat is due to the incumbents’ scrutiny and 
judgments, an additional analysis is warranted. Instead of considering the totality of the 
white players’ population, the white-white reactivation might depend on the number of 
white veterans that are present on the teams. Veterans are more likely to be more 
judgmental, and impose a higher pressure on one’s value-threat. Thus, in model 7C I 
introduce an interaction term between white-white tie reactivations and the number of 
white veterans. The inclusion of such term substantially improves model fit (BIC: -203), 
again demonstrating the added informational value of this latter model specification. The 
interaction term is positive and significant (p < 0.05), suggesting that the number of white 
veterans has a deep impact on the effect that white-white reactivations have. The higher 
the number of veterans, the safer white sponsors’ feel when helping a demographically 
similar other, and hence the stronger the effect on performance that gets produced. 
Moreover, the inclusion of the interaction term has a deep impact on the base effect of the 
white-white reactivation, as predicted by H7. In comparison to the previous model, the 
effect drops significantly, and its difference with the white-black coefficient becomes 
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statistically significant, providing evidence for H6. Therefore, when considering the role 
played by veterans, both H6 and H7 find empirical support. 
Testing the moderating effect of sponsors’ relational embeddedness in 
the discriminated group 
Finally, I will explore how relational embeddedness impacts the effect of value-
threat. Hypothesis 8 posits that highly embedded white sponsors should experience less 
value-threat, and thus the white-white tie reactivations should be stronger where 
sponsors’ are more embedded. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
I incorporate sponsors’ relational embeddedness in Model 9A, where I separate 
high and low levels of embeddedness for each of the pair-wise dyads based on racial 
similarity/dissimilarity. The introduction of relational embeddedness improves model fit, 
demonstrating that the inclusion of relational embeddedness provides meaningful 
information to the regression models. Hypothesis 8 assumes that players that are more 
embedded in the network should perceive lower levels of value threat, and thus should be 
more helpful towards demographically similar others. In regression terms, I should thus 
expect that white sponsors with high embeddedness should have a stronger impact on 
white newcomers’ performance than white sponsors’ that are less embedded. A 
comparison between the magnitude of the effects of the coefficients for white-white 
reactivation (sponsors’ high embeddedness) and white-white reactivation (sponsors’ low 
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embeddedness) seems to provide such evidence. In fact, the magnitude of the former is 
higher than the latter, and a comparative F-test proves that the difference is statistically 
significant (p < 0.05). Therefore, Model 8A provides evidence to support H8. 
As discussed for H3, the sponsors’ tenure could be a confounding factor of their 
levels of relational embeddedness, as the two constructs are likely to be correlated. To 
investigate this potential problem, I run an analysis similar to Model 8A in the following 
table, dividing my effects by high and low levels of sponsors’ tenure. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 9 reports such analysis. The focus in Model 9A is on the difference between 
the coefficients white-white reactivation (sponsors’ high tenure) and white-white 
reactivation (sponsors’ low tenure). Unexpectedly, the latter is higher than the former, 
with their difference being substantial and statistically significant (p < 0.05). This implies 
that while more embedded discriminated sponsors’ are more likely to have a deeper 
impact on demographically similar newcomers’ performance (Model 8A – Table 8), the 
same happens for sponsors that have a lower tenure (Model 9A – Table 9) – in other 
words, highly tenured white sponsors are less likely to help a newcomer to perform 
better. 
A final test is required to jointly consider the dynamics of sponsors’ tenure and 
relational embeddedness of white sponsors.  The regression model presented in Table 10 
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estimates the effect of both high and low levels of white sponsors’ tenure and relational 
embeddedness.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Model 10A, presented in Table 10, includes four dummy variables for white-to-
white reactivations (i.e. both the newcomer and the sponsors’ are white). These variables 
distinguish between the four possible combinations of high and low sponsors’ tenure and 
relational embeddedness. In order to provide empirical evidence for supporting 
hypothesis 8, the difference in magnitude between coefficients of high and low relational 
embeddedness should be positive and statistically significant, across levels of sponsors’ 
tenure. Thus, both differences between coefficients (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) should be relevant 
and significant. Comparative F-tests support this view (p < 0.05). Hence, this stringent 
test of H8 provides further empirical evidence for the hypothesis.  
A similar comparison can be done to confirm the negative effect of white 
sponsors’ tenure on white-to-white reactivations. An analysis of the differences between 
coefficients across levels of relational embeddedness (i.e. (1)-(3) and (2)-(4)) once again 
confirms the negative association between white sponsors’ tenure and white newcomers’ 
performance. Both differences are statistically significant (p < 0.05), showing that highly 
tenured sponsors’ are less likely to be associated with higher newcomers’ performance. 
The most interesting cases are the ones featuring white sponsors’ with high tenure but 
low embeddedness (coefficient 2). Such coefficient is not statistically different from zero 
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(p > 0.05), which implies that on average these sponsors are not helpful. Vice versa, the 
most productive sponsors are those highly embedded but with low tenure (coefficient 3). 
These findings will be discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
 The aim of this study was to analyze the extent to which the reactivation of past 
work relationships may enable new organizational members to achieve higher 
performance. To do so, I analyzed a large longitudinal dataset (1985-2011) of basketball 
players of the National Basketball Association (NBA), focusing on shared experience, a 
social tie that embeds an internal form of social capital. My results not only provided 
empirical support for the role of reactivated shared experience in generating higher 
performance for the newcomers, but also explored and found how relevant factors – 
including internal organizational structure, tie strength, tie dormancy and demographic 
similarity – impact the magnitude of the effect of shared experience reactivation on 
newcomers’ performance. My findings contribute to the management literature and have 
practical repercussions. 
Theoretical contributions 
Contributions to the socialization literature 
Although traditional management and organization scholars have devoted much 
attention to analyzing employees’ socialization and organizational entry (Louis 1980; 
Louis, Posner, and Powell 1983), the topic has received less attention in the last decade, in 
stark contrast with the greater mobility that characterized contemporary internal and 
external labor markets (O’Mahony and Bechky 2006). This study contributes to this long-
standing tradition of scholarship. Past shared experience has been proven to have a relevant 
impact on newcomers’ socialization and performance, particularly early in employees’ 
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careers, and this offers a novel theoretical insight to the socialization literature, which has 
rarely demonstrated how the effects of different factors may enhance or slow newcomers’ 
performance contingent on their prior experience. I argue that this finding may open a 
fruitful research stream, highlighting the need for further theoretical explanations and 
empirical validations of how socialization processes may have various levels of effect for 
more or less experienced professionals. Moreover, the effect of the reactivation of social 
ties also provides not only a theoretical but also an empirical contribution. Given the 
increasing mobility of labor markets, it is becoming more common for employees to join 
teams and organizations where prior colleagues work (Somaya, Williamson, and 
Lorinkova 2008).  
In particular, this study demonstrates the importance of considering not only the 
current network structure when analyzing socialization, but also how newcomers’ relational 
history may have significant effects on their performance. Sharing experience with co-
workers proves to have a relevant impact on the socialization of newcomers, and my results 
hint at how peer co-workers may actually be more relevant than hierarchical relationships 
during the socialization process. Moreover, this study highlights the relevance of career 
stage during socialization. Indeed, basketball players seem to leverage their networks less 
and less as they become more experienced, showing a learning process through which they 
learn how to transition from organization to organization more easily. The socialization 
literature has rarely taken such factors into consideration, given the major focus on 
newcomers’ that are early in their careers. However, whereas this study mainly focuses on 
past shared experience, future research could also consider the potential effects of other 
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types of prior social ties (such as communication, friendship, or knowledge transfer).  
Contributions to the social network literature 
 My study also provides contributions to two different sub-streams of the network 
literature. The first is the literature on the reactivation of social ties (Levin et al. 2011). By 
focusing on a behavioral reactivation – in comparison to the previous studies, which 
focused on cognitive ones – I was able to explore whether the idiosyncratic social capital 
contain in network relations and developed in specific organizational settings can be 
reactivated in different ones. Such focus is particularly relevant as previous studies have 
primarily focused on network benefits that are structural and informational (e.g. Srivastava 
2011). Reactivated ties have been interpreted similarly to the re-instantiation of network 
bridges (Burt 1992), without taking into consideration the potential social capital embedded 
within the tie. I shed light on this issue not only by showing that the reactivation of shared 
experience does indeed matter, but also by illustrating how it depends on characteristics of 
the tie itself (i.e. tie strength). I am also able to contribute to the debate on the nature of 
social networks – which are either considered informational mechanism or sociological 
process (Castilla 2005). Under this light, the positive, quadratic effect of the reactivation of 
multiple shared experience ties is particularly interesting. Given the fixed amount of 
information about a potential new organizational member, if the benefit deriving from 
networks was primarily informational we would expect reactivated ties to have decreasing 
returns. On the other hand, empirically finding increasing returns shows that there are 
positive externalities from multiple reactivated ties, as we would expect from a social 
enrichment effect. The addition of extra trusted contacts and multiple mentors should (and 
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does) indeed facilitate the integration of a new member in a group. Although such finding 
does not discount the informational role of networks, it also highlights that the primary role 
of social ties is not of conducts of information, but also carriers of socially embedded 
knowledge and trust. 
Moreover, past analyses that have focused on the informational advantages of 
reactivated communication ties (e.g. Srivastava 2011) suffer from the impossibility of 
disentangling the effects of time from those of the network structure has limited the value 
of such analyses. In fact, although scholars have criticized traditional social network studies 
for their inability to account properly for the passage of time (Levin et al. 2011), they often 
ignore that time is embedded in how networks form, and hence in their cross-sectional 
structure. It is easy to see why: since ties that are less frequently active tend to be network 
bridges (Granovetter 1983), reactivated ties are generally connections that span structural 
holes – and hence provide informational advantages. Thus, when studying reactivated ties 
there is always a risk of theoretically and empirically confounding the effects of network 
reactivation with those emanating from social structure. This research leverages the 
analysis of newcomers’ organizational entry to avoid such bias. A new organizational 
transition can be compared to an exogenous shock on an ego network’s social structure – 
when a new member joins an organization, they needs to rebuild their personal network 
from its foundations. Analyzing the contribution of network reactivation to this process is 
particularly important, as it isolates the reactivation itself from the prior social structure 
(compare the transitions of A and B in Figure 1 for a graphical and intuitive illustration of 
this point). 
 86 
 
 This approach also allows me to orthogonally disentangle tie strength from tie 
dormancy and from other time-based effects (like employees’ tenure). My large-scale 
statistical analysis of the effects of dormancy and tie strength provides, for the first time, 
support for the independent effects of dormancy and relational embeddedness. It shows that 
the rate of decay of shared experience seems to be independent from tie strength, in 
contrast to what previous scholars’ findings (Levin et al. 2011); this counter intuitive 
finding calls for a better understanding of the process of tie decay, perhaps by examining 
different types of ties. 
 Finally, my analysis of the role of demographic similarity in contributing to the tie 
reactivation process provides relevant contributions to the literature on homophily and 
performance. Whereas homophily is taken-for-granted phenomenon by the managerial and 
sociological literatures, much is still to be understood as to whether homophilous ties 
improve individual performance. My study advances the current literature by finding, for 
the first time, empirical evidence for theories based on value-threat, a mechanisms that 
takes place among discriminated groups. Empirical evidence shows that tie reactivation has 
a lower effect between members of discriminated groups, and that numeric representation 
and sponsors’ relational embeddedness play a role in determining the magnitude of the 
beneficial network effect. The analyses of both moderators revealed fine-grained effects. In 
the case of numerical representation, it appears that being represented in the higher status 
strata matters the most. This finding is justifiable along the lines of value-threat based 
mechanisms – veterans are more likely to add pressure and form expectations on the 
newcomer’s and on the sponsor’s behavior, and thus numerical representation is more 
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likely to play a major role in that group. Moreover, a comparative analysis of the effects of 
sponsor’s relational embeddedness and tenure revealed the oppositional nature of these two 
moderators. Despite their relatively high correlation – incumbent with higher tenure are 
more likely to develop stronger ties with the rest of the organization – I find that sponsors’ 
tenure (which I interpret as status in the internal hierarchy) has a negative impact on the 
effects of tie reactivation. The interpretation that follows is that sponsors in the 
discriminated group with a higher status have more to lose when helping similar 
newcomers, and thus are less likely to help them. At the same time, however, when they 
develop a sense of trust with the rest of the incumbents (signaled by a high relational 
embeddedness) they are able to offset the perceptions of value-threat, and thus are more 
willing to help out. 
 An important characteristic of my study is the analysis of a white population as the 
discriminated group. To my knowledge, the NBA is one of the rare settings in which the 
discriminated group does not overlap with a discriminated social minority (e.g. African-
American, women, etc.). This is important as it acts as a setting in which value-threat 
theories can be tested independently from discrimination that became institutionalized in 
societal strata. 
Managerial contributions 
This study has also several implications for practice. By considering the relevance 
of reactivated social ties on new organizational members’ performance, this paper offers 
managers a different perspective on hiring practices. Whereas generally a major emphasis 
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is placed on human capital during hiring and staffing decisions (Huselid et al. 1997), the 
importance of prior social networks shows an additional, low-cost factor that can enable 
teams and organizations to fully take advantage of prior network structures (Reagans et al. 
2004). 
Change is intrinsic to organizational life, and managing employee turnover and 
staffing decisions is fundamental to sustaining performance in the long run. In this 
perspective, two of my findings are particularly important. First, reactivated ties are more 
relevant for younger, less-experienced workers. So when deciding how to staff a specific 
project-team, or evaluating a young candidate, managers should particularly pay attention 
to extant social networks. In contrast, my findings seem to suggest that reactivated ties may 
be detrimental for more experienced workers: this might be due to problems of over-
embeddedness (Uzzi 1997), where trust may reach levels that are too high and create a 
sense of comfort that might not align with the competitiveness between employees required 
to maximize performance. The second relevant managerial implication concerns the length 
of the project/task. Again, network reactivation has a greater impact early in a socialization 
period, and hence is more important in contexts where short-term performance is 
paramount, or where projects/tasks are not expected to last very long. Whereas in the long 
run newcomers reach approximately the same level of performance, managers should bear 
in mind that the strongest impact of ties reactivation occurs earlier in the process. 
Limitations and conclusions 
All studies have limitations, and this study is no exception. The greatest potential 
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concern lies in the generalizability of the results – using sports data analyses to make 
inferences about other organizational settings always calls for caution. However, I believe 
that such concerns are limited, given the nature of my study. Specifically, my study’s focus 
is on the process by which newcomers learn the set of routines and social norms that 
characterize their new social setting. Basketball teams are good examples of organizations 
with strong norms and culture, but they are not particular in how these elements are 
embedded to their organizational structures. In other words, I believe them to be good 
representations of settings where idiosyncratic social norms are at play, but how they 
operate is not substantially different than in other, more traditional organizations - such as 
firms. 
 Another limitation of this study lies in how I consider past shared experience to 
generally carry a positive effect. Indeed, network scholars have recently shown that not all 
social ties carry such positive attributes, but can also have quite negative consequences 
(Labianca and Brass 2006). However, I have reasons to believe this potential bias may not 
be relevant enough to significantly alter the results of my study. First, the analysis of the 
frequency of negative ties reveals that only one social connection out of 10 has negative 
repercussions (Labianca and Brass 2006), and that their presence is even less likely in 
settings characterized by high task interdependence and network density (Labianca and 
Brass 2006). Moreover, I assume that positive ties tend to self-select in a high-mobility 
market, as negative ties tend to be broken off, either by the parties involved or by 
management (this is especially true in the case of sport clubs, when team performance 
suffers from bad player relationships). Thus, in general I assume my analysis to be robust 
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against the potential presence of negative ties, although future studies should consider the 
different effects of positive, neutral and negative ties on new employees’ socialization and 
performance. 
 In conclusion, my analysis of the effects of tie reactivation on newcomers’ 
performance has revealed how past social networks can deeply influence the career 
trajectories of high status professional, providing theoretical contributions to the 
socialization literature, as well as the literature on demographic similarity and social tie 
reactivation. Studying the dynamic nature of social networks proved to be a fruitful avenue 
for managerial research, and hopefully this study will be a stepping stone for future 
investigations aimed at clarifying how social networks form, activate and dissolve, and 
how such processes impact the performance of individuals in organizations.
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Example of tie reactivation between newcomer and sponsor. 
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Figure 2. Expected effect of tie reactivation on newcomers’ socialization 
trajectories  
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Figure 3. Example of the role of sponsors’ relational embeddedness 
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Figure 4. An example of differing time-based effects on tie reactivation. 
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Figure 5. Example of data structure. 
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Figure 6. Predicted effect of multiple tie reactivations. 
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Figure 7. Moderating effect of socialization time on multiple tie reactivations. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Individual performance 8.43 8.19 -13.00 63.00
2. Human capital (PER previous season) 12.48 4.29 -48.60 90.30 0.35
3. Team size 16.87 2.44 11.00 20.00 0.03 -0.01
4. Team performance (prior season) 0.48 0.16 0.13 0.88 -0.07 0.01 -0.17
5. # of games played in season (cumulative) 30.78 22.18 1.00 102.00 0.17 0.13 -0.11 0.03
6. Time (within season) 44.65 25.07 1.00 108.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.71
7. Age 26.15 4.38 17.21 39.65 0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.19 0.00 0.02
8. Experience in the NBA 4.09 4.16 0.00 20.00 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.18 0.02 0.03 0.92
9. Is playoff game (1 = yes) 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.13 0.29 0.37 0.08 0.08
10. Tie reactivation (dichotomous) 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.39 0.40 0.03
11. Tie reactivation (continous) 0.25 0.60 0.00 5.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.37 0.03 0.88
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Table 2. Regression analysis of the effect of tie reactivation on 
newcomers’ performance (NBA efficiency) 
 
  
Model
Human capital (PER previous season) .367*** .368*** .344*** .343*** .343*** .344*** .344***
# of games played in season (cumulative) .055*** .055*** .055*** .055*** .056*** .053*** .055***
Time (within season) - .018*** - .018*** - .019*** - .017*** - .019*** - .015*** - .017***
Team size .199*** .2*** .205*** .205*** .205*** .205*** .204***
Team performance (prior season) -3 .285*** -3 .301*** -3 .253*** -3 .249*** -3 .25*** -3 .251*** -3 .252***
Age - .2 - .209 - .4** - .404** - .403** - .403** - .406**
Experience in the NBA .038 .042 .304* .308* .307* .306* .309*
Is playoff game (1 = yes) -2 .46*** -2 .46*** -2 .461*** -2 .428*** -2 .449*** -2 .428*** -2 .652***
H1a: Tie reactivation (dichotomous) .111 3 .43*** 3 .435*** 3 .43*** 3 .438***
H1a: Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x Experience in the NBA - .47*** - .47*** - .471*** - .469*** - .474***
H1b: Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x Time (within season) - .011*** - .016**
H1b: Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x # of games played in season - .006* .007
H1b: Tie reactivation (first half of season) 3 .751***
H1b: Tie reactivation (second half of season) 3 .143***
H1b: Tie reactivation (playoffs) 3 .824***
Player-level fixed effects
Constant
Observations (player-year)
Number of players
BIC
Difference in BIC with previous nested model
a Unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust t-scores are in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects.
7.421* 11.58** 11.70** 11.64** 11.67** 11.73**
1,587,087
-47
Included
236,505
1,943
7.230*
236,505 236,505 236,505 236,505 236,505
2G
(-10.95)
(-15.83)
(-5.945)
(-7.684)
(-7.826)
(-2.343)
(-1.715)
(-19.06)
(-11.39)
(-11.02)
(-9.705)
(-9.248)
(-11.31) (-11.29)
2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 2F
(-11.28) (-11.31) (-10.95) (-10.92) (-10.93) (-10.92)
(-15.54) (-15.54) (-15.94) (-15.82) (-16.09) (-13.96)
(-6.608) (-6.608) (-6.880) (-5.879) (-6.935) (-5.038)
(-7.178) (-7.186) (-7.716) (-7.692) (-7.711) (-7.685)
(-7.743) (-7.774) (-7.834) (-7.818) (-7.830) (-7.818)
(-1.191) (-1.232) (-2.320) (-2.341) (-2.337) (-2.331)
(-0.216) (-0.241) (-1.69) (-1.707) (-1.708) (-1.694)
(-20.14) (-20.14) (-20.59) (-20.12) (-20.33) (-20.12)
(-0.618) (-10.61) (-10.59) (-10.57) (-10.62)
(-11.29) (-11.27)
(-3.724) (-2.561)
(-1.689) (-0.99)
Included Included Included Included Included Included
236,505
1,943 1,943 1,943 1,943 1,943 1,943
- 7 -1,532 -41 -1 -36
1,588,659 1,588,666 1,587,134 1,587,093 1,587,133 1,587,097
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Table 3. Regression analysis of the moderating role of tie strength and 
dormancy on the effect of tie reactivation on newcomers’ performance 
(NBA efficiency) 
 
Human capital (PER previous season) .344*** .343*** .343*** .343***
# of games played in season (cumulative) .055*** .055*** .055*** .055***
Time (within season) - .019*** - .019*** - .019*** - .019***
Team size .205*** .203*** .205*** .204***
Team performance (prior season) -3 .253*** -3 .253*** -3 .241*** -3 .244***
Age - .4** - .395* - .396* - .393*
Experience in the NBA .304* .298* .3* .296*
Is playoff game (1 = yes) -2 .461*** -2 .459*** -2 .461*** -2 .459***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) 3 .43***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x Experience in the NBA - .47*** - .493*** - .462*** - .486***
H2: Tie reactivation (high tie strength) 3 .942***
H2: Tie reactivation (low tie strength) 3 .288***
H4a: Tie reactivation (high tie dormancy) 3 .263***
H4a: Tie reactivation (low tie dormancy) 3 .421***
H4b: Tie reactivation (high strength - high dormancy) (1) 3 .846***
H4b: Tie reactivation (high strength - low dormancy) (2) 3 .909***
H4b: Tie reactivation (low strength - high dormancy) (3) 3 .131***
H4b: Tie reactivation (low strength - low dormancy) (4) 3 .298***
Player-level fixed effects
Constant
Observations (player-year)
Number of players
BIC
Difference in BIC with previous nested model
a Unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust t-scores are in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects.
(-10.95) (-10.96) (-10.93) (-10.94)
Baseline 3A 3B
(-6.880) (-6.847) (-6.874) (-6.837)
(-15.94) (-15.93) (-15.9) (-15.88)
(-7.834) (-7.853) (-7.789) (-7.818)
(-7.716) (-7.663) (-7.721)
(-1.647)
(-2.320) (-2.293) (-2.297) (-2.277)
(-20.59) (-20.63) (-20.59)
(-1.69) (-1.661) (-1.67)
(-10.58)
(-7.442)
(-7.576)
(-10.41)
(-9.638)
(-6.753)
Included Included Included
-31
1,587,103
236,505
1,943
236,505 236,505 236,505
11.58** 11.52** 11.50**
Included
11.45**
1,943
1,587,134 1,587,080 1,587,143
1,943 1,943
- -54 9
(-10.61)
3C
(-7.68)
(-20.63)
(-9.973)
(-10.94)
(-11.03)(-11.31) (-11.97) (-10.45)
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Table 4. Regression analysis of the moderating role of sponsors’ 
relational embeddedness on the effect of tie reactivation on newcomers’ 
performance (NBA efficiency) 
 
Human capital (PER previous season) .344*** .344*** .345*** .343*** .344*** .344***
# of games played in season (cumulative) .055*** .055*** .055*** .055*** .055*** .055***
Time (within season) - .019*** - .019*** - .019*** - .019*** - .019*** - .019***
Team size .205*** .208*** .206*** .204*** .206*** .208***
Team performance (prior season) -3 .253*** -3 .319*** -3 .326*** -3 .246*** -3 .265*** -3 .315***
Age - .4** - .402** - .4** - .399** - .406** - .403**
Experience in the NBA .304* .307* .305* .303* .31* .307*
Is playoff game (1 = yes) -2 .461*** -2 .46*** -2 .463*** -2 .461*** -2 .46*** -2 .459***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) 3 .43***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x Experience in the NBA - .47*** - .483*** - .481*** - .467*** - .474*** - .483***
Tie reactivation (high sponsors' embeddedness) 3 .822***
Tie reactivation (low sponsors' embeddedness) 3 .281***
Tie reactivation (high sponsors' embeddedness - core only) 3 .811***
Tie reactivation (low sponsors' embeddedness - core only) 3 .273***
Tie reactivation (high sponsors' embeddedness - periphery only) 3 .339***
Tie reactivation (low sponsors' embeddedness - periphery only) 3 .461***
Tie reactivation (high sponsors' tenure) 3 .673***
Tie reactivation (low sponsors' tenure) 3 .37***
(1) Tie reactivation (sponsors' high tenure - high embeddedness) 3 .843***
(2) Tie reactivation (sponsors' high tenure - low embeddedness) 3 .428***
(3) Tie reactivation (sponsors' low tenure - high embeddedness) 3 .81***
(4) Tie reactivation (sponsors' low tenure - low embeddedness) 3 .264***
Player-level fixed effects
Constant
Observations (player-year)
Number of players
BIC
Difference in BIC with baseline model
a Unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust t-scores are in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects.
(-8.755)
(-6.734)
(-9.35)
(-9.996)
-1 -11- -41 -35 10
1,587,134 1,587,093 1,587,099 1,587,144 1,587,133 1,587,123
236,505
1,943 1,943 1,943 1,943 1,943 1,943
11.71** 11.60**
236,505 236,505 236,505 236,505 236,505
11.58** 11.59** 11.59** 11.58**
Included Included Included Included Included Included
(-10.47)
(-9.095)
(-10.6)
(-8.931)
(-10.03)
(-9.977)
(-10.07)
(-10.03)
(-11.31) (-11.48) (-11.49) (-11.02) (-11.32) (-11.46)
(-20.60) (-20.59)
(-10.61)
(-20.59) (-20.59) (-20.64) (-20.59)
(-1.69) -1.703 (-1.695) (-1.686) (-1.72) (-1.702)
(-7.950)
(-2.320) (-2.328) (-2.321) (-2.317) (-2.350) (-2.327)
(-7.75) (-7.809)
(-7.834) (-7.938) (-7.949) (-7.805) (-7.869)
(-7.716) -7.81 (-7.727) (-7.651)
(-6.880) (-6.841) (-6.845) (-6.885) (-6.849) (-6.821)
(-11)
(-15.94) -15.94 (-15.95) (-15.95) (-15.92) (-15.9)
4D 4E
(-10.95) (-11) (-11.01) (-10.95) (-10.94)
Baseline 4A 4B 4C
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Table 5. Regression analysis of the effect of multiple tie reactivations on 
newcomers’ performance (NBA efficiency) 
 
  
Human capital (PER previous season) .35*** .35*** .35*** .349***
# of games played in season (cumulative) .055*** .055*** .055*** .055***
Time (within season) - .018*** - .019*** - .018*** - .018***
Team size .204*** .204*** .204*** .204***
Team performance (prior season) -3 .277*** -3 .294*** -3 .283*** -3 .274***
Age - .365* - .357* - .366* - .369*
Is playoff game (1 = yes) -2 .457*** -2 .458*** -2 .46*** -2 .44***
Experience in the NBA .181 .179 .181 .184
Tie reactivation (continous) 1 .982*** 1 .702*** 1 .982***
Tie reactivation (continous) - squared .223*
Tie reactivation (continous) x Experience in the NBA - .244*** - .259*** - .243*** - .243***
Tie reactivation (sponsor is coach) 1 .622***
Tie reactivation (sponsor is player) 2 .045***
Tie reactivation (continous) x Time (within season) - .004*
Player-level fixed effects
Constant
Observations (player-year)
Number of players
BIC
Difference in BIC with baseline model
a Unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust t-scores are in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects.
- -53 -3 -5
1,943 1,943 1,943 1,943
1,587,742 1,587,689 1,587,739 1,587,737
11.33** 11.07** 10.85** 11.42**
236,505 236,505 236,505 236,505
(-1.982)
Included Included Included Included
(-4.28)
(-8.265)
(-8.480) (-8.774) (-8.456) (-8.438)
(-8.127) (-6.436) (-8.112)
(-2.101)
(-1.01) (-1.002) (-1.013) (-1.026)
(-2.108) (-2.073) (-2.114) (-2.124)
(-20.39) (-20.46) (-20.42) (-20.10)
(-7.53) (-7.528) (-7.566) (-7.517)
(-7.811) (-7.859) (-7.823) (-7.801)
(-15.56) (-15.67) (-15.54) (-15.48)
(-6.635) (-6.710) (-6.627) (-6.585)
5A 5B 5C 5D
(-11.02) (-11.07) (-11.03) (-10.99)
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Table 6. Regression analysis of the moderating role of demographic 
similarity on the effect of tie reactivation on newcomers’ performance 
(NBA efficiency) 
 
Human capital (PER previous season) .344*** .344*** .344*** .343***
# of games played in season (cumulative) .055*** .055*** .055*** .055***
Time (within season) - .019*** - .019*** - .019*** - .019***
Team size .205*** .205*** .205*** .205***
Team performance (prior season) -3 .253*** -3 .222*** -3 .251*** -3 .248***
Age - .4** - .399** - .399** - .398**
Experience in the NBA .304* .301* .303* .302*
Is playoff game (1 = yes) -2 .461*** -2 .457*** -2 .461*** -2 .46***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x Experience in the NBA - .47***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) 3 .43***
Tie reactivation (white newcomer) 4 .112***
Tie reactivation (black newcomer) 3 .214***
Tie reactivation (white sponsor(s)) 3 .393***
Tie reactivation (black sponsor(s)) 3 .453***
Tie reactivation (mixed sponsors) 3 .339***
H5: Tie reactivation (homophilous tie) 3 .325***
H5: Tie reactivation (heterophilous tie) 3 .643***
Tie reactivation (mixed tie) 3 .327***
Player-level fixed effects
Constant
Observations (player-year)
Number of players
BIC
Difference in BIC with baseline model
a Unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust t-scores are in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects.
6B
-10.94
-15.93
(-6.876)
-7.716
(-7.824)
(-2.312)
-1.682
(-20.61)
Baseline 6C6A
(-10.95) (-10.91)(-10.94)
(-15.94) (-15.96)(-15.86)
(-6.880) (-6.884)(-6.826)
(-7.716) (-7.727)(-7.723)
(-7.834) (-7.829)(-7.769)
(-2.320) (-2.311)(-2.312)
(-1.69) -1.68-1.673
(-20.59) (-20.60)(-20.56)
(-11.31)
(-10.61)
(-9.909)
-8.618
-10.51
-7.175
(-9.902)
(-7.16)
(-9.661)
(-9.489)
236,505 236,505236,505
Included IncludedIncluded
11.58** 11.54**11.54**
Included
11.56**
236,505
1,587,134 1,587,1451,587,090
1,943 1,9431,943 1,943
1,587,158
- 11-44 24
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Table 7. Regression analysis of the moderating role of numeric 
representation of the discriminated group on the effect of tie 
reactivation on newcomers’ performance (NBA efficiency) 
 
Human capital (PER previous season) .344*** .344*** .344*** .341***
# of games played in season (cumulative) .055*** .055*** .055*** .054***
Time (within season) - .019*** - .019*** - .019*** - .018***
Team size .205*** .206*** .182*** .201***
Team performance (prior season) -3 .253*** -3 .219*** -3 .292*** -2 .201***
Age - .4** - .397* - .379* - .41**
Experience in the NBA .304* .3* .286# .311*
Is playoff game (1 = yes) -2 .461*** -2 .459*** -2 .458*** -2 .449***
Number of white players .138***
Number of white veterans - .243***
Number of veterans - .005
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x Experience in the NBA - .47*** - .459*** - .458*** - .46***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) 3 .43***
Newcomer Sponsor(s)
H6: Tie reactivation: White White 3 .802*** 3 .8** 2 .074*
H6: Tie reactivation: White Black 4 .257*** 4 .297*** 4 .281***
Tie reactivation: White Mixed 3 .847*** 3 .794*** 3 .829***
Tie reactivation: Black White 3 .108*** 3 .112*** 3 .202***
Tie reactivation: Black Black 3 .238*** 3 .14*** 3 .249***
Tie reactivation: Black Mixed 3 .213*** 3 .245*** 3 .239***
H7: Tie reactivation: White White       x # of white players .003
H7: Tie reactivation: White White       x # of white veterans .954*
Player-level fixed effects
Constant
Observations (player-year)
Number of players
BIC
Difference in BIC with baseline model
a Unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust t-scores are in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects.
11.58** 11.51** 11.75***
236,505 236,505
1,943 1,943 1,943
1,587,134 1,587,003 1,586,927
- -131 -76
236,505
(7.701) (7.373)
(9.331) (9.395)
Included Included Included
(-0.008)
(8.987) (9.064)
(4.854) (4.840)
(6.207) (6.212)
(-11.31)
(-10.61)
(-10.94) (-10.82)
(5.765) (2.318)
(-2.320) (-2.305) (-2.231)
(-1.69) (1.666) (1.620)
(-20.59) (-20.59) (-20.57)
(-6.880) (-6.827) (-6.802)
(-7.716) (7.721) (6.449)
(-7.834) (-7.763) (-7.913)
Baseline 7A 7B
(-10.95) (10.92) (10.87)
(-15.94) (15.86) (15.85)
(-4.681)
(-2.375)
(1.726)
(-20.48)
(-10.93)
7C
(11.01)
(15.59)
(-6.487)
(7.655)
(3.291)
(-3.219)
(-0.0949)
11.88***
236,505
1,943
1,586,800
-203
(7.775)
(9.420)
(1.659)
Included
(2.107)
(9.062)
(4.849)
(6.320)
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Table 8. Regression analysis of the moderating role of discriminated 
sponsors’ relational embeddedness on the effect of tie reactivation on 
newcomers’ performance (NBA efficiency) 
 
Human capital (PER previous season) .344*** .345***
# of games played in season (cumulative) .055*** .055***
Time (within season) - .019*** - .018***
Team size .205*** .211***
Team performance (prior season) -3 .253*** -3 .269***
Age - .4** - .397*
Experience in the NBA .304* .299*
Is playoff game (1 = yes) -2 .461*** -2 .462***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x Experience in the NBA - .47*** - .474***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) 3 .43***
Newcomer Sponsor(s) Sponsors' embeddedness
H8: Tie reactivation: White White High 4 .808***
H8: Tie reactivation: White White Low 2 .762***
Tie reactivation: White Black High 4 .593***
Tie reactivation: White Black Low 4 .286***
Tie reactivation: Black White High 3 .404***
Tie reactivation: Black White Low 3 .261***
Tie reactivation: Black Black High 3 .902***
Tie reactivation: Black Black Low 2 .998***
Tie reactivation: Black Mixed Not split (average) 3 .213***
Tie reactivation: White Mixed Not split (average) 3 .924***
Player-level fixed effects
Constant
Observations (player-year)
Number of players
BIC
Difference in BIC with baseline model
a Unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust t-scores are in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects.
1,943 1,943
1,587,134 1,587,098
- -36
Included Included
11.58** 11.40**
236,505 236,505
(-8.633)
(-6.395)
(-4.959)
(-6.772)
(-6.468)
(-8.637)
(-3.349)
(-4.733)
(-8.933)
(-5.589)
(-2.320) (-2.292)
(-1.69) (-1.657)
(-20.59) (-20.65)
(-11.31) (-11.20)
(-10.61)
(-6.880) (-6.806)
(-7.716) (-7.914)
(-7.834) (-7.854)
Baseline 8A
(-10.95) (-11)
(-15.94) (-15.9)
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Table 9. Regression analysis of the moderating role of discriminated 
sponsors’ tenure on the effect of tie reactivation on newcomers’ 
performance (NBA efficiency) 
 
Human capital (PER previous season) .344*** .344***
# of games played in season (cumulative) .055*** .055***
Time (within season) - .019*** - .018***
Team size .205*** .206***
Team performance (prior season) -3 .253*** -3 .242***
Age - .4** - .394*
Experience in the NBA .304* .296*
Is playoff game (1 = yes) -2 .461*** -2 .46***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x Experience in the NBA - .47*** - .463***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) 3 .43***
Newcomer Sponsor(s) Sponsors' tenure
Tie reactivation: White White High .984*
Tie reactivation: White White Low 4 .003***
Tie reactivation: White Black High 3 .656***
Tie reactivation: White Black Low 4 .406***
Tie reactivation: Black White High 3 .238***
Tie reactivation: Black White Low 3 .282***
Tie reactivation: Black Black High 3 .737***
Tie reactivation: Black Black Low 3 .072***
Tie reactivation: Black Mixed Not split (average) 3 .126***
Tie reactivation: White Mixed Not split (average) 3 .882***
Player-level fixed effects
Constant
Observations (player-year)
Number of players
BIC
Difference in BIC with baseline model
a Unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust t-scores are in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects.
- 5
1,943 1,943
1,587,134 1,587,139
11.58** 11.43**
236,505 236,505
(-4.873)
Included Included
(-8.851)
(-6.238)
(-7.548)
(-7.543)
(-8.593)
(-4.855)
(-5.982)
(-4.352)
(-10.61)
(-1.685)
(-20.59) (-20.62)
(-11.31) (-10.94)
(-2.320) (-2.284)
(-1.69) (-1.647)
(-7.834) (-7.825)
(-15.94) (-15.78)
(-6.880) (-6.760)
Baseline 9A
(-10.95) (-10.87)
(-7.716) (-7.735)
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Table 10. Regression analysis of the moderating role of discriminated 
sponsors’ relational embeddedness and tenure on the effect of tie 
reactivation on newcomers’ performance (NBA efficiency) 
 
Human capital (PER previous season) .344*** .343***
# of games played in season (cumulative) .055*** .055***
Time (within season) - .019*** - .019***
Team size .205*** .207***
Team performance (prior season) -3 .253*** -3 .254***
Age - .4** - .396*
Experience in the NBA .304* .3*
Is playoff game (1 = yes) -2 .461*** -2 .46***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) x Experience in the NBA - .47*** - .469***
Tie reactivation (dichotomous) 3 .43***
Tie reactivation (non white-to-white) 3 .413***
Sponsors' tenure Sponsors' embeddedness
(1) Tie reactivation: White-to-white High High 2 .779***
(2) Tie reactivation: White-to-white High Low .583
(3) Tie reactivation: White-to-white Low High 4 .648***
(4) Tie reactivation: White-to-white Low Low 2 .805***
Player-level fixed effects
Constant
Observations (player-year)
Number of players
BIC
Difference in BIC with baseline model
a Unstandardized coefficients are reported; robust t-scores are in parentheses.
# p < 0.1, * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects.
Baseline 10A
(-10.95) (10.95)
(-15.94) (15.96)
(-6.880) (-6.902)
(-7.716) (7.764)
(-7.834) (-7.814)
(4.812)
(-2.320) (-2.294)
(-1.69) (1.663)
(-20.59) (-20.59)
(-11.31) (-11.24)
(-10.61)
(10.46)
(1.208)
(5.307)
(3.251)
Included Included
11.58** 11.48**
236,505 236,505
1,943 1,943
1,587,134 1,587,147
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